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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since Samuel Williston and his advisors introduced Section 90 into 
the first Restatement of Contracts, the role of estoppel-particularly 
promissory estoppel-has generated continuing controversy among 
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courts and contracts scholars. 1 Doctrinally, promissory estoppel 
serves two functions in contract law. First, promissory estoppel serves 
as a substitute for contract law's familiar requirement of "considera-
tion. "2 Second, estoppel permits enforcement of contracts that do not 
satisfy the statute of frauds.3 
In addition, estoppel plays an important role in property law. Be-
cause consideration is unnecessary to support transfers of real prop-
erty, estoppel's principal role in property law is as a doctrinal 
alternative to the writing generally necessary for real property con-
veyances. Estoppel is important not only as a basis for upholding 
transfers of fee interests, but also as a foundation for creating (and 
terminating) servitude interests, for resolving boundary disputes, and 
for protecting leasehold interests against forfeiture. Indeed, estoppel's 
important role in property law long predates the rise of promissory 
estoppel as a basis for contract liability. 
Much of the debate over promissory estoppel in current contract 
. scholarship focuses on whether promissory estoppel liability is reli-
ance-based or promise-based. That is, do courts enforce promises be-
cause they induce reliance, or is reliance important only as evidence 
that the promisor has communicated- by words or actions-an intent 
to be bound?4 That question- critical in contract scholarship-is also 
1. For a recent discussion of the evolution of the promissory estoppel doctrine, see 
Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 WILLAMETIE L. REV. 
263 (1996). 
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1982). Section 90 is included in 
Chapter 4 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which is entitled "Formation 
of Contracts-Consideration." Topic 2, which includes section 90, is entitled 
"Contracts Without Consideration." 
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1981). Section 139 is included 
in Chapter 5 of the Restatement, which is entitled "The Statute of Frauds." Topic 
7, which includes section 139, is entitled "Consequences of Non-Compliance." 
Comment (a) to section 139 indicates that the section is "complementary to§ 90." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 cmt. a (1981). 
4. Edward Yorio and Steve Thel have argued that promise, not reliance, is the foun-
dation for the promissory estoppel doctrine. They argued that the prospect of 
definite and substantial reliance screens for seriously considered promises, but 
that it is the serious consideration the promisor gives to the promise, not the 
promisee's reliance interest, that is critical in promissory estoppel cases. See Ed-
ward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111, 
113 (1991). Daniel Farber & John Matheson had earlier argued that reliance 
was no longer critical in promissory estoppel cases; they concluded that, without 
regard to reliance, "any promise made in furtherance of an economic activity is 
enforceable." Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estop-
pel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake", 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 904-5 
(1985); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 
(1996); James Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 83 CAL. L. REv. 547, 568-70 (1995); 
W. David Slawson, The Role of Reliance in Contract Damages, 76 CORNELL L. 
REV. 197, 216-28 (1990)(arguing that reliance-based recovery is normatively 
wrong). 
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important in property law. In several respects, however, estoppel doc-
trine is more complex in property law than in contract law. First, in 
property law the doctrine of estoppel frequently operates against a 
party who has made no express promise at all. That is, a party may be 
estopped by a course of conduct that involves no verbal representa-
tions; indeed, on rare occasions, silence alone may give rise to an es-
toppel. 5 Second, in property law the doctrine raises a question 
addressed with far less frequency in contract law: to what extent are 
successors-in-interest estopped by the actions of their predecessors? 
Suppose, for instance, a landlord's oral representations induce reli-
ance in a tenant, or one neighbor's representations induce reliance in 
another. Neither the representation alone, the reliance alone, nor the 
two in combination, explain why a successor-in-interest to the original 
promisor should be estopped by the actions of a predecessor. Because 
obligations in property law frequently "run with the land" (or with an 
estate in land), courts must, with some frequency, reconcile the inter-
ests of the disappointed promisee with those of a subsequent pur-
chaser who did not, herself, make the promise. 
In this Article, I examine the use of estoppel principles in property 
law cases. My enterprise is descriptive, not normative. I have ex-
amined the use of the estoppel doctrine in several doctrinal areas: 
land transfers, creation of servitudes, termination of servitudes, 
boundary disputes, and landlord-tenant law. In so doing, I have fo-
cused on cases decided since 1960. 
An examination of case law in those areas suggests that estoppel 
doctrine performs several functions in property law. First, courts 
often invoke the estoppel doctrine to enforce promises or representa-
Until the last fifteen years, by contrast, the conventional wisdom was that 
reliance was the critical element in the promissory estoppal doctrine. That wis-
dom became conventional with publication of the landmark two part article, L. L. 
Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 
1 & 2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 573 (1936-37). See also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative 
Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 32 (1979). More recent commentary has also ar-
gued that reliance is essential to promissory estoppal claims, at least in commer-
cial contexts. See Sidney W. DeLong, The New Requirement of Enforcement 
Reliance in Commercial Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 As Catch 22, 1997 Wis. 
L. REv. 943; Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New Consensus" on Promissory 
Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 CoLUM. L. REV. 580 (1998). 
5. One might subsume these cases under the rubric of contract law if one adopted a 
theory of contract law that did not require a "meeting of the minds" -subjective 
assent, by both parties, to be bound. Randy Barnett, for instance, argues that 
contract law requires only a manifestation of consent to be bound by acts, or even 
silence, in the face of reliance. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Con-
tract, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 269, 312-15 (1986). Jean Braucher has argued, however, 
that Barnett's consent theory is so broad that it could tum even negligence liabil-
ity into a form of breach of contract. See Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Con-
tractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
697, 703-06 (1990). 
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tions. In these cases, reliance is important because it provides evi-
dence of a promise, not because courts are independently concerned 
about reliance divorced from promise. When reliance provides strong 
corroboration of promise, courts enforce promises rather than limiting 
promisees to recovery of expenditures made in reliance on the prom-
ise. On the other hand, courts sometimes invoke estoppel in tort-like 
settings, holding, in effect, that the relationship between the parties, 
or the non-verbal acts of one of the parties, creates a duty to rescue a 
neighbor or a tenant from dire financial consequences.6 This use of 
estoppel doctrine-to protect the interests of parties who rely on the 
non-verbal acts of another-is more controversial than use of estoppel 
doctrine to enforce express promises, but nevertheless represents a 
significant subcategory of estoppel cases. 
Case law also suggests that successors-in-interest can be estopped 
by the actions of their predecessors-but only where the successor-in-
interest had adequate opportunity to learn of the actions which gave 
rise to the estoppel. 
II. LAND TRANSFERS 
A landowner seeking to transfer an interest in land typically exe-
cutes a deed and delivers it to a transferee. Unless the transfer is 
gratuitous, it will generally be preceded by a contract, executed by 
both buyer and seller, obligating seller to sell, and buyer to purchase, 
at the price stipulated in the contract. If the deed adequately de-
scribes the property and is properly executed by the transferor, no 
statute of frauds problem is likely to arise. Even if no deed has been 
executed, neither party may invoke the statute of frauds as a defense 
if a properly executed contract of sale includes all of the material 
terms of the agreement. 7 If a purchaser refuses to perform, the seller 
may obtain judgment for the purchase price; if the seller balks, the 
purchaser may obtain specific performance. 
Estoppel doctrine becomes important if neither contract nor deed 
complies with the statute of frauds. Suppose, for instance, a writing 
memorializes a purported transfer, but the writing omits a material 
6. Grant Gilmore labeled promissory estoppel as "quasi-tort" liability. See GRANT 
GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 89 (1974). Others have also noted that pro-
tection of reliance, as contrasted with enforcement of promise, has a tort-like 
character. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 4, at 945. 
For a discussion of the duties common law courts impose on neighboring land-
owners, see Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 55 (1987). 
7. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 131, enumerates the require-
ments for a writing to satisfy the statute of frauds while section 125 subjects a 
contract for the transfer of land to the statute's requirements. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 131 (1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 125 (1977). 
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term, or the transferor's signature. If one party takes actions that 
make sense only on the assumption that the parties have made a deal, 
and if the other party, upon learning of those steps, takes no action to 
set the record straight, estoppel may prevent the recalcitrant party 
from invoking the supposed defect to avoid enforcement of the dis-
puted deal.a Similarly, estoppel principles may operate to bind the 
parties even if there has been no writing at all. 
A. Inadequate Writings 
When one party to a land transfer transaction invokes estoppel to 
overcome a defective writing, the principal question confronting the 
court is whether the writing and the conduct of the parties, taken to-
gether, establish an intent to be bound, or whether the parties had 
merely engaged in negotiations which had not yet culminated in a 
"deal." In general, if the written document is defective because it was 
not executed by the necessary parties, courts are more likely to treat 
the document as preliminary, and to insist on a great deal of reliance 
before validating the transfer. A written agreement does not provide 
strong evidence of an intent to be bound if one of the parties has not 
yet signed the agreement; indeed, failure to sign provides some evi-
dence of an intent not to be bound. Hence, courts are reluctant to 
enforce unexecuted agreements absent exceptionally strong cor-
roborating evidence of promise. 
By contrast, if the document has been properly executed, but is 
missing a material term (such as a description of the property) courts 
are more likely to conclude that the parties had formed an intent to be 
bound. The very act of signing indicates an intent to be bound to 
something; the question is only the content of the agreement, not its 
existence. In this situation, courts are more willing to use the conduct 
of the parties to flesh out the missing term. 
8. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 129, entitled "Action in Reliance; Spe-
cific Performance," provides: 
A contract for the transfer of an interest in land may be specifically en-
forced notwithstanding failure to comply with the Statute of Frauds if it 
is established that the party seeking enforcement, in reasonable reliance 
on the contract and on the continuing assent of the party against whom 
enforcement is sought, has so changed his position that injustice can be 
avoided only by specific enforcement. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 129 (1981). Thus, the black letter starts 
by assuming a contract and providing that the contract is enforceable without a 
writing if there has been reasonable reliance which would create injustice if spe-
cific enforcement were not awarded. Comment (b), however, makes it clear that 
conduct which would make no sense in the absence of an agreement can be used 
to prove the existence of the agreement. The drafters provided that "the extent to 
which the evidentiary function of the statutory formalities is fulfilled by the con-
duct of the parties" is an element in determining whether the section is applica-
ble. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 129 cmt. b (1981). 
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Hoffman v. S. V. Company9 illustrates the reluctance with which 
courts invoke estoppel principles to bind parties to the terms of unex-
ecuted land sale contracts.IO In Hoffman, negotiations between seller 
and purchasers led to a telephone conversation during which the par-
ties reached an understanding that the purchasers would pay $90,000 
for the property. The following day, January 22, purchasers sent 
seller a letter memorializing the conversation, and restating the 
agreement as "$90,000 payable at 30% down," with the remainder to 
be "paid pursuant to a five year installment note at 9 3/4% interest."11 
The letter also indicated that seller agreed to subordinate its note to a 
construction loan and that the city's approval of a subdivision was a 
condition precedent to the agreement. Purchasers sent a $5,000 
check, which seller deposited in a trust account. Purchasers spent 
$436 for survey work necessary for the subdivision, and then sought 
and obtained subdivision approval. 
Seller then prepared a sale agreement and delivered the agree-
ment, unsigned, to purchasers. Before purchasers signed the agree-
ment, seller began negotiating with another purchaser. On March 23, 
two days after purchasers obtained subdivision approval, seller's 
agent urged purchasers to complete the deal as quickly as possible. 
On April 8, however, seller sold all of its assets, including the land at 
9. 628 P.2d 218 (Idaho 1981). 
10. Other cases illustrate the same principle. For instance, in Sayer v. Bowley, 243 
Neb. 801, 503 N.W.2d 166 (1993), the sellers and buyers had conducted discus-
sions about a purchase of the disputed land. The seller asked his lawyer to me-
morialize the terms of the discussions, but the written "agreement" was modified 
several times, and never executed. The purchasers paid the sellers $25,000 in 
"earnest money," made arrangements to farm the land, and apparently planted 
crops. See id. at 803, 503 N.W.2d at 168. When the sellers refused to convey, the 
purchasers sought specific performance of the alleged oral contract the parties 
had reached, or at least damages for loss of the benefit of their bargain. See id. 
Although the trial court awarded return of the purchasers' earnest money, 
together with a statutory lien to reimburse them for monies spent increasing the 
value of the land, the court held that the purchasers were not entitled to specific 
performance or to the benefit of their bargain. The Nebraska Supreme Court 
affirmed, emphasizing that after the original unsigned "contract," four more 
drafts were prepared-none of them signed. See id. "Suffice it to say," wrote the 
court, "that the conduct of the parties during the drafting of these documents 
indicates that several important terms had not been discussed or agreed upon at 
the time of the alleged oral agreement." Id. 
Similarly, in Bennett v. Horton , 592 S.W.2d 460 (Ky. 1979), the Kentucky 
Supreme Court held that seller was not estopped to invoke the statute of frauds 
when the seller's lawyer had prepared, but the seller had not signed, a sale con-
tract. There, the purchasers moved on to the property, gave the seller items of 
personal property which the seller treated as rent, and made $15,000 in improve-
ments to the property. Several years after the purchaser first took possession, 
the seller sought to increase the rent. When the purchaser refused to pay, the 
seller sought possession, and the purchaser (unsuccessfully) invoked the un-
signed agreement-and estoppel principles-as a defense. See id. at 463-64. 
11. Hoffman, v. S.V. Co., 628 P.2d at 220. 
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issue, and returned purchasers' deposit. Only then did purchasers 
sign the agreement seller had delivered more than two weeks earlier. 
When purchasers sought specific performance of the oral contract to 
transfer land, the trial court held the oral agreement unenforceable 
for failure to comply with the statute of frauds. 12 
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting purchasers' argu-
ment that the doctrines of part performance and equitable estoppel 
required enforcement of the oral agreement. As the court recognized, 
the doctrine of part performance-a close relative to estoppel13-per-
mits enforcement of an oral agreement when the purchaser has made 
substantial improvements in reliance on an oral contract for the sale 
ofland. The court, however, concluded that the $436 cost of obtaining 
subdivision approval was not substantial in relation to the value of the 
property.14 
Although the court concluded that the record included substantial 
evidence to support the trial court's finding that the parties had 
reached a mutual, albeit oral, understanding as to the terms of the 
sale transaction, a court might naturally wonder, in a case like Hoff-
man, why neither of the parties executed the sale contract. If the 
agreement was a done deal, one would have expected purchasers, at 
least when urged by seller's agents to complete the deal as soon as 
possible, to execute the sale contract with dispatch. Their failure to do 
so undoubtedly cast some suspicion on their contention that the deal 
had been finalized.15 
In contrast, when the defect in the writing relates to indefiniteness 
of the terms, rather than failure to execute, courts are more likely to 
12. The purchasers had argued that the $5,000 deposit check, deposited by the sell-
ers, when considered together with the letter confirming the telephone conversa-
tion and the unsigned contract, should have been enough to satisfy the statute of 
frauds. The court disagreed, concluding that neither the check nor the letter in-
cluded all of the material terms of the contract, and holding that the contract 
could not be considered in conjunction with the check or the letter because 
neither of those documents made explicit reference to the contract. See id. 
13. Indeed, comment (a) to section 129 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 
which deals with enforcement of oral contracts when a party has changed his 
position in reliance on the contract, represents that the provision "restates what 
is widely known as the 'part performance doctrine.'" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 129 cmt. a (1981); see also L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., 
The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 2), 46 YALE L.J. 373, 392 
(1937)(noting that doctrine of part performance is "closely allied" to the estoppel 
doctrine). 
14. Moreover, the court did not even suggest that the purchaser would be entitled to 
recover the $436. See Hoffman v. S.V. Co., 628 P.2d 218, 223 (Idaho 1981). 
15. See Walker v. Ireton, 559 P.2d 340, 346 (Kan. 1977)(finding estoppel claim where 
"[t)he worst which can be said is that Ireton repeatedly promised that he would 
perform the oral contract and that he would . .. enter into a written contract to 
evidence the same. It was stipulated that the parties understood a written con-
tract was to be prepared."). 
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enforce the agreement even if the party seeking enforcement has not 
proven substantial changes in his own position. Consider Brooks v. 
Hackney. 16 There, sellers agreed to sell 25 acres of their 113-acre 
tract. Purchaser, in his own handwriting, drew up a sale contract 
which described the property in a way that would have included an 
infinite number of northern boundaries.11 The agreement provided 
that purchaser would pay $6,000 down, and $400 per month, begin-
ning on a certain date at an interest rate of 12%. The interest rate 
was later decreased to 11 %, but purchaser made the monthly pay-
ments for eight years and four months. At that point, the parties 
could not reach an agreement about purchase of the remainder of the 
sellers' tract. As a result, the purchaser stopped making payments 
and sought return of payments already made, alleging that the sale 
contract was unenforceable for indefiniteness. 
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial court had 
properly awarded summary judgment to sellers. In holding purchaser 
estopped from challenging the contract's validity, the court acknowl-
edged uncertainty about whether purchaser had actually made signifi-
cant use of the land, but noted that by making regular payments, 
purchaser had effectively reserved use of the land, and had led sellers 
to believe "that they were precluded from selling or renting the prop-
erty to someone else."18 The sellers had not, however, pointed to any 
concrete loss they would have suffered if the court had permitted pur-
chaser to invoke the statute of frauds, nor did sellers demonstrate how 
purchaser's actions had cleared up the indefiniteness of boundaries; in 
fact, sellers stipulated, by affidavit, that purchaser could draw any 
northern boundary he wished, so long as that boundary would enclose 
a total of 25 acres.19 In short, sellers did not demonstrate how en-
forcement of the contract was necessary to prevent any injustice to 
them.20 Nevertheless, the court enforced the contract because the "re-
liance" provided ·good evidence that the parties had intended to bind 
themselves to an enforceable contract.21 
16. 404 S.E.2d 854 (N.C. 1991). 
17. The agreement provided that the boundary would be a line drawn from "White-
head line" to the "road that goes by Plainfield Church" in a way that would "in-
clude 25 acres in all." Id. at 858. From any point on the Whitehead line, the 
boundary could have been drawn to a corresponding point on the specified road. 
Without knowing where on Whitehead line the boundary should start, it would be 
impossible to determine precisely what land had been conveyed. 
18. Id. at 859. 
19. See id. at 857. 
20. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 129 (1981)(providing that a "contract 
for the transfer of an interest in land may be specifically enforced" despite a fail-
ure to comply with statute of frauds if "injustice can be avoided only by specific 
enforcement."). 
21. See Yorio & Thel, supra note 4, at 159 (arguing that reliance increases the likeli-
hood that the parties actually made a promise). 
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The result in Brooks v. Hackney is typical: when the parties have 
executed what appears to be a final land sale contract, albeit one 
which leaves a term indefinite, courts are quick to invoke estoppel 
against a party seeking to renege, even if the party seeking to enforce 
can show very little in the way of actual reliance. 22 That is, when 
even meager reliance generates confidence that one party has made a 
promise, courts typically enforce the promise, rather than limiting the 
promisee to perhaps non-existent reliance damages. 
B. Oral "Agreements" 
Even when the parties have generated no writings at all, courts 
have been willing, on occasion, to estop landowners from denying an 
oral promise to transfer real property. Courts generally assume that a 
reasonable person would not make expenditures on land owned by a 
stranger in reliance on the stranger's oral promise to convey the land. 
22. For example, in O'Sullivan v. Bergenty, 573 A.2d 729 (Conn. 1990), a landlord 
contracted to sell property to a tenant. The sale contract included the price, pay-
ment terms, an interest rate, and a puzzling statement that "A.P.R. may vary at 
option of Buyer." Id. at 730. The closing was to take place 13 months later, to 
accommodate the seller's tax needs. After the sale contract was executed, the 
purchaser continued to pay rent on the premises (as the contract provided), made 
a roof repair and a change in the door opening to the garage. In addition, the 
purchaser subleased a portion of the premises. When the purchaser sought spe-
cific performance, the seller contended that the agreement's APR term was too 
indefinite to permit enforcement. The trial court agreed, but held the agreement 
enforceable nevertheless, invoking the estoppel doctrine. The Connecticut 
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the continued payment of rent, together 
with the roof repair and the garage door change, were sufficient to establish the 
reliance necessary to invoke the estoppel doctrine. See id. at 732-33. Note, how-
ever, that even if there had been no sale contract, the purchaser would have been 
obligated, as a tenant, to pay monthly rent. Moreover, the court did not indicate 
how much the purchaser had paid for the roof repair and the garage door change. 
Hence, it appears clear that the court enforced the agreement because it believed 
the parties had a deal, not to avoid an injustice generated by detrimental 
reliance. 
Even when the written document does not appear to be a final sale contract or 
deed, the writing itself can be sufficient to support an estoppel or part perform-
ance claim. See Sutton v. Warner, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 632 (Ct. App. 1993)(finding an 
estoppel claim accompanied by written receipt for money received, together with 
a representation that purchaser would have first option to purchase property 
upon death of seller; purchaser made significant improvements on property). 
In contrast, in Gagne v. Stevens, 696 A.2d 411 (Me. 1997), a seller and a pur-
chaser entered into a contract to sell "a piece of lot # 58 ... in the approximate 
size of30± ... located at the boundaries of the Foster Point Rd and Rt. 27." Id. at 
413. When the seller refused to perform, the Maine Supreme Court held that the 
property description made the agreement too indefinite to enforce as a contract, 
and declined to address the purchaser's equitable estoppel claim, noting that the 
purchaser had argued only promissory estoppel, not equitable estoppel. The 
court also emphasized that the purchaser had generated no material issue of fact 
about any irretrievable change in position he might have made. See id. at 416. 
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Hence, courts are typically unwilling to enforce oral agreements for 
the transfer of land, even if the supposed transferee has made im-
provements on the land.23 
The situation is somewhat different when family members are in-
volved. Social norms may lead a family member/promisee to forego a 
writing even though the same promisee would never forego a writing 
when entering into a land sale transaction with a stranger.24 
Suppose, for instance, a daughter alleges that her mother promised 
her that if she were to improve a parcel of land, the mother would 
convey the parcel to her. The daughter makes improvements, and, af-
ter a falling out with her mother, seeks to enforce the promise. Note 
first that the promise is plausible; within the family, parents and chil-
dren do not typically reduce all of their agreements to writing, and a 
daughter might well make repairs or improvements in reliance on her 
mother's oral promise. At the same time, however, because children 
often act to benefit their parents without expectation of immediate re-
ward, the act of improving or repairing does not establish beyond 
question that the acts were performed in reliance on the mother's 
promise. How, then, do courts respond to estoppel claims based on 
alleged oral promises by family members? 
Where the supposed promisee can prove not only expenditures 
made on the property, but also a contemporaneous transfer of money 
or other legal rights to the family member who is the property's record 
23. As we have seen, courts are even unwilling to enforce agreements accompanied 
by a written memorandum when the memorandum has not been signed by the 
parties. Here, the legal norm mirrors the social norm: land transfers are serious 
business which require formal writings. This is especially true when the parties 
are not relatives or friends. See, e.g., Walker v. Ireton, 559 P.2d 340, 346 (Kan. 
1977)(rejecting estoppel claim, noting that "[h]ere there is no claim that there 
was any relationship of trust or confidence between the parties."). 
For examples of judicial unwillingness to enforce alleged oral agreements to 
transfer land, see Anderson v. Mooney, 279 N.W.2d 423 (N.D. 1979)(refusing to 
recognize estoppel to deny land sale contract even though alleged purchaser culti-
vated land for three years). 
Of course, where there is no evidence of improvements made on the land, mere 
allegations of oral contract-even if conceded by the promisor-are inadequate to 
generate an estoppel claim. See, e.g., Durham v. Harbin, 530 So. 2d 208 (Ala. 
1988)(refusing to allow nonfraudulent representations to abrogate the statute of 
frauds). 
24. See Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity and Re-
lational Contract, 77 N.C. L. REv. 551, 556 (1999)("The closer and more interde-
pendent the parties, the less likely promises and agreements will be isolated and 
clearly spelled out, because the parties operate in accordance with implied under-
standings, and because the value generated by those implied understandings is 
greatly enhanced if the reciprocal nature of the duties within the relationship is 
left unspoken."); cf Eric A. Posner, Comment, Norms, Formalities, and the Stat-
ute of Frauds: A Comment, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1971, 1974-75 (1996)(noting that 
repeat players in a contract relationship might eschew writings because of a 
norm against writings in their "business community"). 
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owner, courts have little difficulty finding, and enforcing, the family 
member's promise. Cases generally involve improvements made by a 
child to land owned by a parent. Although a child may work on a par-
ent's land even without an express promise, judicial intuition probably 
suggests that few children give money or property to a parent, and 
make improvements on their parents' land, unless child and parent 
have reached an understanding that the parent will give the land (or 
some equivalent) to the child in return.25 In American society, the 
norm is that children assist their aging parents, but that wealth gen-
erally flows from parent to child, not the other way around. 
Koval v. Koua[26 is illustrative.27 While William Koval was a mi-
nor, his parents used money William had inherited to place a down 
payment on a home. When, some years later, William was involved in 
a divorce suit, he deeded his interest in the house to his parents. They 
later sold the house, realizing a $16,000 profit. William testified that 
25. When the family members involved are not as close as child and parent, it would 
appear even less likely that one family member would give money to another, and 
make improvements on the other's land, absent an understanding that the land 
would belong to the improver. Thus, in Rolland v. Biro, No. 44632, 1982 WL 
2547 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 18, 1982), an ex-husband alleged that his ex-wife had 
orally agreed to transfer to him her one-half interest in a parcel ofland. The ex-
. husband had made payments of$10,000 in cash to the ex-wife, and subsequently 
made improvements on the land. In addition, there was testimony that a written 
deed would have been executed but for a title company's mistaken assertion that 
the ex-husband already held all interests in the land. Over the objection of the ex-
wife's executor, the court invoked the part performance and estoppel doctrines to 
enforce the ex-wife's oral agreement. See id. at *6. 
Indeed, even if the family member has made no improvements, but has con-
veyed title to land in return for a promise to reconvey part of the land, an estop-
pel claim is likely to succeed. For example, in Barber v. Fox, 632 N.E.2d 1246 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1994), a sister (and each of six other siblings) conveyed their 
shares of concurrently owned land to their brother. The six siblings each received 
monetary compensation for their shares, but the sister did not, instead relying on 
her brother's promise, at a future time, to reconvey one part of the land on which 
the sister might build a house. When the brother later refused to convey, the 
court invoked estoppel principles, concluding that the sisters' conveyance was 
"exclusively referable" to the oral agreement. See id. at 1250. 
26. 576 So. 2d 134 (Miss. 1991). 
27. For another illustration, see Roundy v. Waner, 570 P.2d 862 (Idaho 1977). The 
Waners, daughter and son-in-law of the Roundys, contended that the Roundys 
had made an oral agreement to relinquish their equitable interest in property to 
which the Waners already had legal title (when the Roundys bought the house, 
title was taken in the Waners' name because the Roundys had been unable to 
obtain financing due to their advanced age). The Waners made payments on the 
mortgage note, paid property taxes and insurance, assumed a loan on which Mr. 
Roundy was obligated, and spent more than $2,300 on materials for repairs un-
dertaken on the property, which was subsequently sold for $22,500. The court 
held that the trial court "was fully justified in reaching a conclusion that the 
W aners had indeed changed position in reliance upon what they understood to be 
an oral agreement." Id. at 866. The Waner's part performance established that 
the sale contract, although oral, was enforceable. 
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in return for keeping the $16,000 profit, his parents offered to give 
him a house ifhe would fix it up. William and his wife made improve-
ments to the house which significantly increased its market value. In 
fact, his parents obtained a $25,000 loan secured by the property, even 
though the property had been worth about $5,250 before William and 
his wife began work on the premises. William then asked his parents 
to give him a deed, but they refused. In response, William and his 
wife brought an action seeking title, or, alternatively, a judgment for 
monies expended in improving the realty.2a 
The Mississippi Supreme Court, relying on estoppel principles, 
awarded William and his wife a judgment for the outstanding balance 
of his parents' bank loan, together with an equitable lien on the prop-
erty. Compelling the parents to give William a deed would have been 
of little value to William, since his parents had already given the 
bank-a bona fide purchaser-a deed of trust to the property. Hence, 
the court awarded William the closest available equivalent to the 
property itself: money damages equal to the profits his parents had 
derived from his work-the amount of the bank loan. Moreover, even 
the court's language suggests that promise, not reliance, is at the 
heart of the estoppel doctrine: 
These principles are based on . .. the belief that a person should do what he 
says he will do in situations where another party is injured by reliance on the 
first party representations .... [T)he test is whether it would be substantially 
unfair to allow a person to deny what he has previously induced another to 
believe and take action on.29 
That is, so long as one's representations lead to detrimental reliance, 
the court held that the party making the representation "should do 
what he says he will do."ao The court did not, however, say that the 
party making the representation "should reimburse the promisee for 
reliance-based losses." 
Similarly, where a family member uproots himself to move onto 
land owned by another family member, and also spends money im-
proving the property, there is a strong likelihood that the parties had 
an understanding that the property would belong to the improver. As 
·a result, courts are likely to invoke estoppel to sustain the improver's 
claim to the property.a1 
28. Kovall v. Kovall, 576 So. 2d at 135-36. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. For example, in Tozier u. Tozier, 437 A.2d 645 (Me. 1981), Calvin's parents owned 
the disputed land as tenants in common. Calvin moved to the land from another 
town, allegedly on the representation that he could have the disputed land to live 
on. Calvin, with the help of his parents, then built a house on the land. Later, at 
the death of Calvin's father, all of the children conveyed to their mother all of 
their rights in any real estate that might have descended to them at law on the 
death of their father. The mother then conveyed the disputed land to Richard, 
Calvin's brother. When Richard brought a forcible entry and detainer action 
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There is, however, another possible explanation for the judicial 
willingness to hold the legal title holder estopped to deny a transfer of 
title to a family member who has made transfers of money or property 
to the legal title holder, and who has moved to or made significant 
improvements to the land. Even if the transfers and improvements 
were not the product of a promise or an understanding between the 
parties, the title holder's failure to warn the improver that the im-
prover would not acquire legal rights might constitute a violation of 
prevailing social norms. That violation might, in turn, lead courts to 
conclude that the title holder has violated a legal duty to protect fam-
ily members from the harm associated with a mistaken belief about 
the nature of their dealings. If the legal title holder breaches this tort-
like duty, the family member would ordinarily be entitled to the losses 
suffered as a result of the failure to warn, which need not require 
transfer of the property. Rather, because reliance damages are so dif-
ficult to calculate, courts might transfer title as the best approxima-
tion of the damages suffered by the improving family member. 
against Calvin, the court held that Richard was not entitled to possession, invok-
ing estoppel as a basis for its decision: "When the donee ... has made substantial 
improvements to the land, and the donee has made the improvements in reliance 
upon the promise to convey the land, courts will enforce the promise to convey." 
Id. at 648. See also Geiger v. Geiger, No. 13841, 1993 WL 476247 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Nov. 16, 1993)(estopping mother from denying promise to transfer to her daugh-
ter when her daughter had moved onto the property, had made monthly pay-
ments on the property and had made improvements to the property); Sturlaugson 
v. Johnson, No. 36633-5-1, 1997 WL 11842 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 1997), review 
denied by 940 P.2d 654 (Wash. 1997)(preventing mother-in-law and father-in-law 
from denying transfer to son-in-law and daughter when son-in-law had made 
payments on the property and made improvements to the property). 
There are exceptions to the general tendency of courts to invoke estoppel or 
part performance when one family member has relied on another family mem-
ber's apparent oral promise to transfer land. In particular, the Wyoming 
Supreme Court, in a series of recent cases, has rigidly enforced the statute of 
frauds. For example, in Davis v. Davis, 855 P .2d 342 (Wyo. 1993), the court 
granted summary judgment to a mother who conveyed disputed property to one 
of her sons after permitting another son. to live on the property and make im-
provements to it for nearly 30 years. The improving son had begun using the 
property immediately after his father's death. However, the court refused to use 
the son's long-term occupancy as a basis for concluding that the mother had 
promised him the property. Moreover, in Fowler v. Fowler, 933 P.2d 502 (Wyo. 
1997), the same court held that the statute of frauds prevented a son from enforc-
ing an alleged oral contract against his father, even though the son had given up 
his job to run the father's ranch and continued to live on the ranch for nearly 
twenty years. See also Ferguson v. Ferguson, 739 P.2d 754 (Wyo. 1987)(finding 
acts of dominion insufficient to corroborate allegations of oral contract). 
There are facts in each of these cases which made the estoppel claims less 
than compelling. In Davis, improvements to the land constituted the only evi-
dence of reliance, while in Fowler, the supposed promisee gave conflicting testi-
mony about the content of the supposed oral agreement. However, taken 
together, the cases strongly suggest that Wyoming courts are less receptive to 
estoppel claims than are most other courts. 
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This alternative explanation for cases invoking estoppel as a basis 
for effectuating a land transfer between family members does not find 
explicit support in the language of judicial opinions. Nevertheless, the 
explanation is consistent with the results in these estoppel cases, and, 
as we shall see, is also consistent with results in other estoppel cases 
where the promise rationale seems less plausible as an explanation for 
the estoppel doctrine. 
III. SERVITUDES BY ESTOPPEL 
Because easements and other servitudes are interests in land, the 
statute of frauds generally requires that they be accompanied by a 
writing.32 Nevertheless, when a landowner induces a purchaser or 
owner of neighboring land to change position by creating a belief that 
the landowner's own land is subject to an easement or other servitude, 
the landowner may be estopped to deny the servitude even if the servi-
tude was never reduced to writing.aa 
A. Representations by Sellers or Developers 
With some frequency, land purchasers seek to restrict a seller's use 
of neighboring land retained by the seller. Specifically, the purchasers 
contend that they were induced to purchase (or build upon) the land 
by the seller's alleged oral representation that the seller's neighboring 
land would be subject to a restriction. Such estoppel claims are prob-
lematic for three reasons. First, the sale of land is generally an event 
accompanied by formality; because there is every reason to expect that 
purchasers (or their lawyers, in some states) will insist that important 
representations be reduced to writing, claims based on oral represen-
32. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES§ 2.7 (Tentative Draft 
No. 1, 1989)(providing that the formal requirements for creation of a servitude 
are the same as those required for creation of an estate in land). 
33. For example the Restatement (Third) of Property provides: 
If injustice can be avoided only by establishment of a servitude, the 
owner or occupier of land is estopped to deny the existence of a servitude 
burdening the land when: 
(1) the owner or occupier permitted another to use that land under cir-
cumstances in which it was reasonable to foresee that the user would 
substantially change position believing that the permission would not be 
revoked, and the user did substantially change position in reasonable 
reliance on that belief; or 
(2) the owner or occupier represented that the land was burdened by 
a servitude under circumstances in which it was reasonable to foresee 
that the person to whom the representation was made would substan-
tially change position on the basis of that representation, and the person 
did substantially change position in reasonable reliance on that 
representation. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.10 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 
1989). 
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tations generate suspicion.34 Second, in the absence of a writing, evi-
dence that there was a promise is often unreliable, and determining 
the scope of the promise may be even more difficult. Third, reliance is 
difficult to establish; even if a seller did make a promise, it is unclear 
whether the purchaser made the purchase in reliance on the promise, 
or whether the purchaser would have bought the property (or built on 
it) even if the seller had made no promise at all.35 Because these 
problems are nearly insurmountable without some written corrobora-
tion of the promise, courts are understandably hesitant to enforce es-
toppel claims based exclusively on oral representations-at least 
where the only alleged reliance is purchase of the property. Conse-
quently, in transactions between a developer and purchaser, estoppel 
claims almost inevitably involve reference to some writing.36 Often, a 
purchaser attempts to use a developer's subdivision plat as a basis for 
estopping the developer. 
A subdivision plat typically lays out building lots and roads, and 
may also describe physical features of the subdivision. The plat may 
also include express easements or use restrictions. When a recorded 
plat includes express servitudes and the deeds to individual parcels 
refer to the plat, the restrictions may be enforced without reference to 
the estoppel doctrine; the writings-the deeds in conjunction with the 
plat-satisfy the statute of frauds.37 Suppose, however, the plat in-
cludes no express servitudes. Does the plat itself provide enough writ-
ten corroboration of the developer's supposed oral promise to restrict 
use of the platted land? 
34. See, e.g., Bendetson v. Coolidge, 390 N.E.2d 1124 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979)(refusing 
to hold seller of commercial property estopped by alleged representations that he 
would develop the remaining property as illustrated in a site plan initialed by the 
buyer and seller; court found no reason to conclude that experienced business-
man, advised by counsel, would believe that seller was so casually locking himself 
into particular development plan). 
35. This problem, of course, is a problem only to the extent that estoppel is a reliance-
based doctrine rather than a promise-based doctrine. See supra notes 4-6 and 
accompanying text. · 
36. But see Nicol v. Nelson, 776 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989)(holding there 
was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding of an easement based 
on estoppel when developer had allegedly assured purchasers orally that he 
would not obstruct their view of the. lake by developing lakefront land). 
37. Sometimes, even though clear written restrictions limit use of the developer's re-
tained parcels, it is less than clear whether particular landowners may enforce 
the restrictions. In such situations, however, courts may hold that the developer 
is estopped to challenge the landowners' right to enforce if sales brochures dis-
played the landowners representations made about the retained land. See White 
Cypress Lakes Dev. Corp. v. Hertz, 541 So. 2d 1031 (Miss. 1989). 
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Generally, as illustrated by Bennett v. Charles Corporation, as the 
answer is no.39 There, Curry platted a subdivision showing 25 lots, 
twelve on one block, designated "Block A," and thirteen across the 
street, on "Block B." Curry sold the entire parcel to Eplin and The 
Charles Corporation, who built two houses on Block B, one of which 
was purchased by the Bennetts. The deed described the property by 
reference to the Curry subdivision plat, but neither the deed nor the 
plat included any restrictive covenants. Eplin became ill, moved into 
the second house on Block B, and sold his interest in the land to The 
Charles Corporation. When the corporation encountered difficulties in 
obtaining a sewer line for Block A, its president decided to clear the 
land and develop it as a cemetery. When the first cemetery lot was 
sold, the Bennetts brought an action seeking to enjoin use of the tract 
for any purposes other than residential purposes, alleging that Eplin 
had made an oral promise to develop the tract as a residential housing 
subdivision. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that 
the Bennetts were not entitled to the injunction, concluding that even 
if Eplin had made an oral promise to develop the tract for residential 
purposes, breach of that promise would not entitle the Bennetts to re-
lief unless they could show that, at the time Eplin made the promise, 
he did not intend to perform.40 
In Bennett, The Charles Corporation did not deny that it had 
formed an intention to develop a residential subdivision, and it is clear 
that Eplin had made some sort of representation to the Bennetts. 
There was, however, no written corroboration of the content of that 
representation. If the court had granted relief to the Bennetts, it 
would have opened the door to many unsubstantiated claims that a 
seller had made representations about future use of retained land. 
Moreover, the only reliance the Bennetts alleged-the purchase of 
their home-was equivocal at best; they might well have purchased 
their home without any representation from the sellers. When the 
Bennetts bought their house, there were already cemetery lots in the 
38. 226 S.E.2d 559 (W. Va. 1976). 
39. See also Huggins v. Castle Estates, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 48 (N.Y. 1975)(holding that 
designation of zoning classification on filed plat map does not estop developer 
from departing from that zoning classification after municipality amends 
ordinance). 
40. See id. at 562-63. The court quoted from its earlier opinion in Cottrell v. 
Nurnberger: 
The mere failure or refusal of the vendor in an oral agreement, which is 
within the Statute of Frauds and for that reason unenforceable, to recog-
nize it as binding or to comply with it does not in itself amount to fraud 
or inequitable conduct upon which to base estoppel, when, as here, it 
does not appear that he intended to violate the oral agreement when it 
was made. . . . The other party to the contract is presumed to know that 
the contract is unenforceable and that he acts under it at his risk. 
Cottrell v. Nurnberger, 47 S.E.2d 454, 461-62 (W. Va. 1948). 
772 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:756 
vicinity. In fact, the new cemetery lot was no closer to the Bennetts' 
home than other cemetery lots that had been in place before the Ben-
netts' home was built. Hence, the court could not be sure that the 
representation had any effect on the Bennetts' decision to purchase.41 
Courts are even more reluctant to invoke estoppel against a devel-
oper when the map shown to the purchasers has not been recorded4 2 
- especially if a recorded plat imposes less onerous restrictions or re-
stricts fewer parcels of land. Unless, the developer has, through its 
behavior, distinguished between its general development intentions 
(evidenced by an unrecorded map) and its intent to create binding re-
strictions (evidenced by a recorded subdivision plat, replete with ex-
press restrictions), a court is unlikely to conclude that the developer 
made an express, serious, promise to abide by the unrecorded map. In 
other words, the purchaser should recognize that if the developer in-
tended to make a binding commitment, developer would have done so 
with greater formality. 
Kincheloe v. Milatzo43 is illustrative. In the office of the devel-
oper's real estate agent hung a map of the "Milatzo Subdivision," 
which showed all lots to be one-half acre in size. The developer then 
filed and recorded a plat of a portion of the subdivision-known as the 
"First Filing"-which expressly restricted the lots to single-family 
residences on one-half acre lots. The developer later sought to develop 
a different portion of the subdivision with smaller lots. The court held 
that oral representations, together with the Milatzo Subdivision map, 
did not estop the developer from developing smaller lots. The court 
found no clear and convincing proof that the developer induced pur-
chasers to purchase the land in the "First Filing" through representa-
tions on which the purchasers had a right to rely. The court 
41. Although the Bennett case involved purchasers seeking to enforce an alleged oral 
promise made by a seller, occasionally, the tables are turned, and sellers seek to 
enforce a promise made by purchasers. If there is no written corroboration from 
the promise, the typical result is similar-no enforcement. See Cooper v. Re-Max 
Wyandotte County Real Estate, Inc. , 736 P .2d 900 (Kan. 1987)(rejecting an estop-
pel argument questioning the existence ofan agreement and the existence of reli-
ance when seller sells lot adjacent to her home, and later seeks to prevent 
construction of building for operation of a real estate business, alleging an oral 
agreement by purchaser to build only a small, 4,000 square-foot medical 
building). 
42. There are exceptions. One of the most frequently cited is Ute Park Summer 
Homes Association v. Maxwell Land Grant Company, 427 P .2d 249, 253 (N.M. 
1967), appeal after remand, 494 P .2d 971 (N.M . 1971), in which the court held 
that an unrecorded plat map depicting a golf course was sufficient, together with 
oral representations, to estop the developer from using the golf course property 
for another purpose. 
43. 678 P.2d 855 (Wyo. 1984). 
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emphasized that it should have been apparent to purchasers that the 
covenants on file pertained to the "First Filing" lots only.44 
Purchaser has a better chance of prevailing on an estoppel claim 
when the purchaser has some written corroboration of the seller's 
promise (beyond the plat itself). For instance, if the seller has distrib-
uted sales brochures representing that certain land would be main-
tained for open space or recreational purposes, the representations in 
the brochures are often sufficient to permit purchasers to establish 
easement by estoppel.45 Moreover, even if the seller has never im-
posed an express written restriction on his own land, a court may hold 
the seller estopped from denying the existence of the restriction if the 
seller has prepared a subdivision plat, and then imposed an express 
restriction in the deed to every lot sold withi,n the subdivision. These 
two factors in combination create greater confidence that the seller 
has made an identifiable representation. 
Thus, in PMZ Oil Company v. Lucroy, 46 the Mississippi Supreme 
Court held a developer estopped from building six townhouse condo-
miniums on a lot retained by the developer after the developer had 
orally represented to a purchaser of a neighboring lot that only single-
family homes would be permitted within the subdivision. As in the 
Bennett case, the developer had displayed to the purchasers a subdivi-
sion plat. Unlike Bennett, however, as the developer sold off the lots, 
it included in each deed an express covenant limiting development to 
one residence per lot. The court held that the developer "in good con-
science may not be allowed to disregard the covenants it had imposed 
upon others to whom it sold lots."47 The developer, by preparing and 
displaying a subdivision plat, and by including the restrictions in the 
deeds to the lots sold, led purchasers to believe that developer would 
abide by the same restrictions on the land he retained. In addition, 
44. See id. at 863. But see Knight v. City of Albuquerque, 794 P .2d 739 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1990)(holding that developers who depicted a golf course on a subdivision 
plat were estopped from using the golf course property for other purposes even 
though the developer explicitly reserved the right to build hotels, cottages, and 
other facilities on any tract in the plat without permission of the owner of any lot 
in the subdivision). 
45. See Shalimar Ass'n v. D.O.C. Enters., 688 P .2d 682, 691 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)(in-
volving sales brochures that referred to golf course depicted on recorded plat; de-
veloper's successors held estopped to build on golf course); Haines v. Minnock 
Constr. Co., 433 A.2d 30, 31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)(involving sales brochure that 
represented "[w)e left untouched the generous and quiet forest," while accompa-
nying map designates area adjacent to purchaser's townhouse as "open space"; 
developer held estopped from building additional townhouses in the open space). 
46. 449 So. 2d 201 (Miss. 1984). 
47. Id. at 207. 
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because the restrictions did appear in writing, a court would have no 
difficulty ascertaining the content of the restrictions.48 
So far, we have examined estoppel claims advanced by purchasers 
seeking to bind developers to restrictions on the use oflots retained by 
the developer. Estoppel doctrine is also available to purchasers seek-
ing to establish affirmative easements over land retained by the devel-
oper. In this situation, the plat alone, without express restrictions, 
may be enough to support an estoppel claim. In particular, a number 
of courts have held that once a developer records a plat which includes 
roads, the developer is estopped to deny purchasers within the subdi-
vision easements to use those roads.49 This does not mean, however, 
that developer is estopped from changing any detail that appears on 
the plat map, or that developer is required to give individual purchas-
ers access to every area on the plat map not designated as a saleable 
lot. 
Thus, in Jones v. Beavers,so the Virginia Supreme Court held that 
designation of a "landing" on a recorded plat of a waterfront subdivi-
sion did not estop the owner of the landing from excluding the pur-
chasers of other lots. The court distinguished cases involving streets 
or alleys, suggesting that because streets and alleys are usually essen-
tial for access to property, "it is only natural" to presume that designa-
tion of a street or alley on a subdivision plat creates an easement to 
use the road.51 By contrast, the court indicated that the word "land-
ing" sometimes signifies a private use, and held that the purchasers 
were not entitled to a presumption that the plat designation, by itself, 
created an easement in the landing.s2 
In other words, courts recognize that subdivision plats are in part 
description, and in part promise. Of course, a developer could ex-
pressly grant all purchasers easements over precisely described roads 
within the subdivision, but courts recognize that even without express 
grants, purchasers will generally presume that the subdivision plat 
constitutes a promise to keep designated roads available for their 
use.53 Hence, the developer is estopped from denying purchasers ac-
48. Cf. Shalimar Ass'n v. D.O.C. Enters., 688 P.2d at 684 (recognizing that recorded 
plat shows golf course; no express restriction on golf course parcel, but deeds to 
all other parcels prohibit structures within 30 feet of golf course property and 
provide that "[l]andscaping shall be planned . .. so as to avoid undue obstruction 
of the view of the golf course from the lots"). 
49. See Cason v. Gibson, 61 S.E.2d 58 (S.C. 1950). Other courts have held estoppel 
unnecessary, finding that filing of a plat showing roads creates a dedication of the 
roads or an implied easement over the roads. See, e.g. , Boucher v. Boyer, 484 
A.2d 630 (Md. 1984); Krzewinski v. Eaton Homes, Inc., 161 N.E.2d 88 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1958). 
50. 269 S.E .2d 775 (Va. 1980). 
51. See id. at 779. 
52. See id. 
53. See id. at 778 (quoting Lindsay v. James, 51 S.E.2d 326, 331 (Va. 1949)). 
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cess to those roads. And, because the developer's successors-in-inter-
est should know that purchasers will treat road designations as 
promises, they, too are bound by the recorded plat.54 When the plat 
designation refers to a physical feature less common and less neces-
sary than roads, however, it is less likely that a court will treat the 
designation itself as a promise. Thus, if a landowner wants access to a 
beach, or a landing, the landowner must generally obtain an express 
easement. Of course, if the purchaser acts on the plat by building im-
provements as if the developer had given the purchaser an easement 
to build improvements-docks, for instance-on common areas, the 
developer will be estopped to deny an easement if the developer does 
not take prompt action to stop the purchaser from making the 
improvements. 55 
In estoppel cases involving developers, the focus is generally on the 
developer's representations, not the developer's duty to disclose infor-
mation or intentions to potential purchasers. Developers and pur-
chasers generally operate at arms length, and courts are loathe to 
imply servitudes from the conduct or silence of a developer. 
In enforcing the developer's representations, however, do courts fo-
cus on reliance or promise? Unfortunately, these cases provide no 
strong evidence to support either position. The general insistence on 
written corroboration of the developer's representation-either 
through sales brochures or plat maps - might seem, at first glance, to 
suggest a focus on promise. However, that insistence might instead 
reflect a belief that purchasers do not act in reliance on oral promises 
by developers. Thus, in the absence of written corroboration, there is 
no need to protect a purchaser's reliance interest. 
Examining the remedies awarded in cases where courts do find es-
toppel is no more helpful. When a purchaser successfully invokes es-
toppel, courts universally enforce developer's promise by creating a 
servitude in purchaser's favor. In this context, however, the award of 
specific performance does not prove much. Because the purchaser's 
supposed reliance is purchase of the property, no relief other than spe-
cific performance would generally be feasible. A court could order re-
scission of the sale contract, but both developer and purchaser would 
generally prefer specific performance to rescission-purchaser, having 
moved into a home, generally doesn't want to leave; and developer 
54. The same principle may apply to other necessities, like sewer lines. One court 
has held that if the developer has built a sewage system which feeds onto prop-
erty owned by the developer, and the developer has maintained control of the 
system, the developer's successors are estopped from contending that they are not 
bound to maintain the system. See Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra, 749 F. 
Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1990). 
55. See Allee v. Kirk, 602 S.W.2d 922 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)(holding that license to use 
waterfront strip to build docks cannot be revoked once docks have been 
constructed). 
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does not want to resell all of the homes he has once sold. In the unu-
sual case where rescission would be attractive to the developer, most 
likely because market prices have increased since the original sale, 
rescission would not adequately protect the purchaser's reliance inter-
est, since return of the purchase price would not leave her with the 
same opportunities she had at the time of the original purchase. As a 
result, neither examination of substantive law nor examination of 
remedies sheds much light, in this context, on whether promise or reli-
ance is of critical importance in the estoppel doctrine. 
B. Representations by Neighbors 
The relationship between neighbors is, in several respects, differ-
ent from the relationship between developer and purchaser. A pur-
chaser does not generally expect the developer to maintain a 
continuing presence once all of the lots are sold off. By contrast, 
neighbors understand that they will continue to live with each other, 
often for years to come. The ongoing relationship shapes the dealings 
between neighbors. First, even if neighbors are not friends or confi-
dantes, the relationship creates a bond of trust. Each knows that the 
other can retaliate, in a myriad of ways, for unneighborly behavior. 
As a result, each can reasonably expect the other to keep her word 
even without any threat of legal sanction. Neighbors have less need 
than strangers to resort to legal formalities, because they have less 
need to rely on legal enforcement. We should expect, therefore, that 
agreements between neighbors will be reduced to writing less often 
than agreements between strangers. And if the neighbors are friends 
or confidantes, the tendency to dispense with writings will be even 
stronger.56 
56. The court in Shepard v. Purvine, 248 P.2d 352 (Or. 1952), in finding an easement 
by estoppel to use water from a neighbor's spring, offered a classic statement of 
the foundation for holding a neighbor estopped by oral representations: 
These people were close friends and neighbors, and they were not deal-
ing at arm's length. One's word was considered as good as his bond. 
Under the circumstances, for plaintiffs to have insisted upon a deed 
would have been embarrassing; in effect, it would have been expressing 
a doubt as to their friend's integrity. We do not believe the evidence 
warrants a conclusion that plaintiffs were negligent in not insisting upon 
a formal transfer of the rights accorded. 
Id. at 361-62. 
On the other hand, when the parties are already in an adversarial position, 
and have made it clear that they intend to resolve their disputes only through a 
written agreement, a party is unlikely to persuade a court that his counterpart, 
by virtue of oral statements, should be estopped to deny the existence of an ease-
ment. See Turner v. Floyd C. Reno & Sons, Inc., 696 P.2d 76, 79 (Wyo. 
1985)(holding that the neighbor who refused to sign proposed statement agree-
ment was not estopped by any oral statements because "the parties intended a 
written instrument be a condition precedent to making operational or effective 
any understandings reached by them at the settlement conference"). 
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Consequently, in disputes between neighbors, the allegation that 
one party made a serious oral promise is more plausible than when 
the dispute is between developer and seller. As a result, courts are 
more willing to hold neighbors estopped by oral promises. Of course, 
mere allegations are hot enough to permit enforcement. But when 
courts examine alleged representations made by neighbors, expendi-
tures made in reliance on the representations often provide valuable 
evidence about the existence and content of the representations. In 
disputes between developers and purchasers, the purchaser typically 
alleges that she relied by purchasing the property. That allegation of 
reliance is difficult to evaluate; the purchaser might reasonably have 
purchased the property even without assurance that neighboring par-
cels would be restricted to 1h acre lots, or limited to residential use 
only. By contrast, when a neighbor makes an estoppel claim, the 
neighbor typically demonstrates that she expended money in a way 
that would have made no sense in the absence of an understanding 
that she had a servitude over neighboring land. 
Roadway agreements provide the most common example. The 
facts in Cleek v. Povia57 illustrate the classic pattern. Cleek and Ma-
lone, neighboring landowners, agreed to build a road along their com-
mon boundary. Although the parties split the cost of the roadway 
equally, 90% of the roadway was placed on the Cleek property. 
Nineteen years and nine months after the roadway was built, Cleek's 
widow brought a trespass action against Povia, Malone's successor-in-
interest. 
The Alabama Supreme Court held that Cleek was estopped to deny 
existence of the easement.58 It would have made no sense for Malone 
to pay half the cost of building a road on Cleek's land if Cleek were 
free to bar Malone from using the road once built.59 Hence, the ex-
penditures themselves provided the court with reliable corroboration 
57. 515 So. 2d 1246 (Ala. 1987). 
58. The court invoked both the theory that an easement by estoppel had been cre-
ated, and the "similar" theory that an "easement by contract " had been created. 
See id. at 1248. 
59. See also Higgins v. Blankenship, 605 S.W.2d 493 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980)(holding 
that when landowner furnishes gravel for construction of roadway over neigh-
bor's land, neighbor held estopped to deny easement); Kohlleppel v. Owens, 613 
S.W.2d 168 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)(holding that when landowner builds new road 
and fence based on oral agreement, part performance doctrine permits enforce-
ment of agreement); Shrewsbury v. Humphrey, 395 S.E.2d 535 (W. Va. 
1990)(finding easement by estoppel where landowner maintained roadway in 
winter, improved it with gravel, and used it for eight years; landowner also testi-
fied that he purchased the property on representation that he could use the dis-
puted roadway). But see Tallarico v. Brett, 400 A.2d 959 (Vt. 1979) (discussed at 
infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text). 
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of the understanding between the parties.so Moreover, the court had 
no difficulty binding the successors-in-interest because "[t]he open and 
obvious nature of the easement is sufficient to put any successor[s] in 
interest on notice."61 
Even when the reliance does not involve improvement to the road-
way itself, courts invoke the easement by estoppel doctrine when a 
landowner's expenditures make it clear that he relied on his neigh-
bor's representation. Thus, if a landowner orients his house in a way 
that would make sense only if he believed he had a right to use his 
neighbor's road, courts will hold the neighbor estopped from denying 
access to the road. s2 
Of course, even when roads are involved, courts will not find an 
easement by estoppel when the improvements made by the party 
claiming "estoppel" are not significant,sa or would have been sensible 
60. See also Shipp v. Stoker, 923 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. App. 1996, writ denied)(finding 
that defendant made improvements on disputed roadway after alleged agreement 
between predecessors to grant an easement in return for grant of certain other 
property). 
61. Cleek, 515 So. 2d at 1248; see also Shipp, 923 S.W.2d 100; cf Holden v. Weiden-
feller, 929 S.W.2d 124, 132 (Tex. App. 1996, writ denied) (holding easement by 
estoppel where recorded deed made reference to easement concluding that it bur-
dens successors because plaintiff "acknowledges seeing a gate from the old road 
... in plain view before he bought the property"). 
62. For example, in Hester v. Chambers, 576 S.W.2d 195 (Ark. 1979), the Chambers 
bulldozed a road across their property, and caused the county to grade the road 
up to the boundary fence separating their property from the Hesters' neighboring 
parcel. The Chambers then dedicated a road right-of-way to the county. Three 
years later, the Hesters asked Chambers whether the road was a county road, 
informing him that they intended to build a house in a way that would make use 
of the road. Chambers assured them that the road was a county road. Later, 
when his wife and son-in-law informed Chambers that the dedicated county road 
stopped ten feet short of the Hesters' boundary, Chambers told them that he 
would wait until after the Hesters built their house before mentioning the ten 
feet to them. When the Hesters built the house, Chambers wrote a letter indicat-
ing that the road stopped ten feet short of the boundary. Five years later, after 
the Hesters had used the road for access to their house, the Chambers sought to 
block access to the road. The Arkansas Supreme Court rejected their attempt, 
holding that the Hesters had acquired an easement by estoppel. See id. at 195-
96; see also Zivari v. Willis, 611 A.2d 293 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (involving drive-
way and garage built to connect to neighbor's road; court holds neighbor estopped 
to object after giving oral permission); Holden v. Weidenfeller, 929 S.W.2d 124 
(Tex. App. 1996)(involving home built near intersection of disputed road; court 
found easement by estoppel to use that road even though deed is not specific 
about location of right of way); Meredith v. Eddy, 616 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1981, no writ)(involving home built at end of disputed road; court found easement 
by estoppel). 
63. See, e.g., Roberts v. Allison, 836 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. App. 1992, writ denied)(having 
land surveyed insufficient improvement to support easement by estoppel); 
Bickler v. Bickler, 391 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965, writ granted), affd in 
part and rev'd in part, 403 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. 1966) (planting of shrubs on his own 
property as if the disputed driveway was a part of the property held not sufficient 
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even if the neighbor had never granted an easement.64 In these cases, 
the actions of the parties provide inadequate corroboration of the sup-
posed representation made by the neighbor. Similarly, if the neighbor 
who has supposedly made an oral representation has consistently and 
in writing indicated that he intends to do no more than give permis-
sion for temporary use, courts will not estop the neighbor from deny-
ing that he has created an easement.Gs In each of these situations, 
there is insufficient evidence to establish that the parties intended to 
create a permanent right.GG 
to support an estoppel claim; shrub planting might make sense even if no ease-
ment had been contemplated). 
64. Woods v. Libby, 635 A.2d 960 (Me. 1993), provides an example. A zoning ordi-
nance would have precluded the landowners from building on their premises un-
less they did so within one year. The landowner's parcel was on a steep grade 
which made it difficult to construct a driveway. The landowner and neighbor 
agreed that the landowner could build and use a driveway across the neighbor's 
parcel, at the landowner's cost. Years later, after the original landowner had sold 
the parcel, the neighbor sought to block the successor's access to the driveway. 
The trial court rejected the successor's easement by estoppel claim, concluding 
that the parties had intended to give the original landowner only a temporary 
right to use the driveway-a sensible conclusion in light of the imminent expira-
tion of the right to build on the parcel. The Maine Supreme Court affirmed, find-
ing support in the record for the trial court's conclusion, but noting that the 
record also contained support-particularly the landowner's long-term use of the 
roadway-for the opposite conclusion. See id. at 961-62; see also Klobucar v. 
Stancik, 485 N.E.2d 1334 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985Xfinding no easement by estoppel 
arose to use neighbor's driveway to reach parking places in back of landowner's 
house even though landowner had configured house so that there was no alterna-
tive access to parking spaces; court noted that when house was built, street park-
ing was permitted, and raised possibility that landowner might obtain access to 
spaces from another neighbor). 
65. See Ceres Ill., Inc. v. Illinois Scrap Processing, Inc., 500 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1986)(find-
ing no easement by estoppel arises when parties intended execution of writing to 
be condition precedent to creation of easement); Zimmerman v. Summers, 330 
A.2d 722 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975)(finding no easement by estoppel when sup-
posed servient owner expressly refused to sign written document creating express 
easement); Brown v. Eoff, 530 P.2d 49 (Or. 1975)(finding no easement by estoppel 
when parties negotiated for express easement while represented by counsel, but 
never reached formal written agreement); Wilson v. McGuffin, 749 S.W.2d 606 
(Tex. App. 1988, writ denied)(finding that plaintiff informed defendant by letter, 
before major improvements were made, that he was granting permission to make 
improvements, but that the permission was consistent with his grandfather's re-
corded affidavit representing that use of the road was permissive only). 
These cases are consistent with Professor DeLong's notion that estoppel doc-
trine should not bind parties to respect reliance expenditures made by others 
when the party has expressed an intention not to be legally bound. See DeLong, 
supra note 4. 
66. On the other hand, when the parties have reduced their agreement to writing, 
but the writing is inadequate to establish a formal easement, the dominant 
owner may need to show less reliance than would otherwise be the case; the writ-
ten agreement provides good evidence of the parties' intentions. Thus, in Shearer 
v. Hodnette, 674 So. 2d 548 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995), one landowner prepared a docu-
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In general, courts are more reluctant to find easements by estoppel 
when agreements between neighbors involve matters less obvious, 
upon physical inspection, than roads.67 Even when a landowner has 
clearly relied on a neighbor's promise-as when the landowner lays 
pipe in reliance on a neighbor's promise to permit use of a well-
courts are at best divided about whether the neighbor should be es-
topped from revoking permission to use the well.GS The problem can-
not be the clarity of the understanding between the parties, because 
courts have been reluctant to invoke estoppel even when the parties 
have reduced their understanding to a written agreement.69 The 
likely explanation rests, at least in part, on fear that successors-in-
interest will lack the means to discover unrecorded easements that 
would not become obvious upon routine inspection of the property. 
Thus, a purchaser may have no way of knowing that his predecessor 
ment giving himself and his wife a personal right to use a road to reach their 
home. Although the court concluded that the document created only a license, 
the court found that $2,000 in road upkeep (spent over a 25-year period) was 
enough to estop neighbors from blocking the road. The court also noted that the 
landowner had granted the Water and Sewer Board an easement which permit-
ted connection to the homes of the servient owners, but that reliance was equivo-
cal because the Water and Sewer Board repaved and widened the disputed road, 
and built a new road, in exchange for the sewer easement. See id. at 551. But see 
Stillwater Columbia Ass'n v. Shepherd, 727 P.2d 596 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986)(find-
ing no easement by estoppel despite written grant of permission to create an exit 
door in neighboring lodge premises, together with expenditure of about $1,800 to 
cut the wall and install the door). 
67. When easements are apparent from physical inspection, the combination of oral 
promise and detrimental reliance generally suffices to permit enforcement. See, 
e.g, Noronha v. Stewart, 245 Cal. Rptr. 94 (Ct. App. 1988)(involving neighbor who 
gave oral permission to construct an encroaching reinforced wall at the top of a 
slope near the border between the two parcels; after landowner spent $8,000 on 
the wall, court concluded that neighbor's successor was estopped from removing 
the wall). 
68. For cases refusing to find estoppel, see Doyle v. Peabody, 781 P.2d 957 (Alaska 
1989); Shultz v. Atkins, 554 P.2d 948 (Idaho 1976). But see Waters v. Pervis, 264 
S.E.2d 551 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)(holding that oral grant of right to use sewer line, 
together with expenditures for maintenance, repair and improvement of pumping 
station, creates easement by estoppel); Mund v. English, 684 P.2d 1248 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1984)(holding that oral grant of right to use a well, together with shared 
installation costs and operating expenses, creates an easement by estoppel). Cf. 
Pinkston v. Hartley, 511 So. 2d 168 (Ala. 1987) (affirming trial court determina-
tion that easement by implication existed for sewer lines because lines were rea-
sonably necessary at severance; indicated that servient owner was estopped from 
objecting to relocation of sewer lines when he gave oral permission and did not 
object to new location until eight months after the lines had ben laid). 
69. For example, in Shultz v. Atkins, 554 P .2d 948 (Idaho 1976), the court refused to 
conclude that the landowner had acquired an easement or a license to use a 
neighbor's well even though the parties' predecessors had reduced their under-
standing to writing, and even though neighbor's deed recited that the transfer 
was subject to a "culinary or water use easement and agreement." Id. at 950. 
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gave a neighbor a right to use a well. 70 That is, whatever the under-
standing between the initial parties to the arrangement, that arrange-
ment will not be treated as a permanent easement if purchasers would 
have no reasonable means of discovering the arrangement or its 
terms.71 Indeed, even if a particular purchaser knows of the terms, 
courts may be reluctant to treat the arrangement as an easement for 
fear that future purchasers might then be burdened by terms they 
could not readily discover. 72 
When, despite the absence of any writing, one landowner makes 
roadway improvements on a neighbor's land, the inference is strong 
that the improvements reflect an oral understanding between the par-
ties. No other explanation is as plausible for the improver's action and 
the neighbor's failure to react. Suppose, however, the parties (or their 
predecessors) have created an express written easement. Suppose fur-
ther that the dominant owner mistakenly improves the wrong road-
way. If the servient owner takes no action in response, but later seeks 
removal of the roadway, can the dominant owner claim an easement 
by estoppel to use the improved roadway? 
This situation presents a more difficult problem because the infer-
ence that the improvements reflect some representation made by the 
70. Doyle v. Peabody, 781 P.2d 957 (Alaska 1989), is illustrative. Before Doyle fin-
ished building his house, his neighbor gave Doyle permission to tap into his 
neighbor's well, and Doyle agreed to pay $12 per month for use of the well. When 
the neighbor sold the premises, he informed his successor of the arrangement, 
and Doyle continued to make the annual payments. When the successor sold to 
Peabody, however, the successor did not mention the water arrangement to 
Peabody. Peabody later attempted to cut off Doyle's water supply, and the court 
sustained his effort, noting that any license Doyle held before the conveyance to 
Peabody did not survive that conveyance. See id. at 961-62. 
71. A similar concern might underlie the result in Eliopulos u. Kondo Farms, Inc., 
643 P.2d 1085 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982). There, the parties orally agreed that Kondo 
would have the right to deposit waste water on land owned by Eliopulos. Kondo 
spent $500 in reliance on the agreement. The court concluded that Kondo had 
acquired an irrevocable license by estoppel, but that the license would last only as 
long as necessary for Kondo to recoup its investment. In that case, the court 
concluded that six years of draining waste water had been sufficient to recoup the 
investment. 
This approach-like rejecting easements by estoppel altogether-provides 
protection to successors-in-interest against difficult to discover unwritten ease-
ments. See id. at 1087-88. But see Fast v. DeRaeve, 714 P.2d 1077 (Or. Ct. App. 
1986) (finding easement by estoppel to flood neighboring land when landowner 
had built dam in reliance on oral promise); Kovach v. General Tel. Co., 489 A.2d 
883 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)(holding that license to maintain power wires had be-
come irrevocable as a result of telephone company's expenditures; successors 
bound because they indicated awareness of the equipment when they purchased 
the property). 
72. Compare Shultz v. Atkins, 554 P .2d 948 (Idaho 1976), where the court refused to 
construe a water use agreement as an easement, even though successor-in-inter-
est had notice of the arrangement. 
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servient owner is much weaker. A more plausible explanation for the 
dominant owner's action is that he improved the roadway in mistaken 
reliance on the language of the written easement. 73 
If the estoppel doctrine were designed primarily to enforce 
promises supported by strong, albeit oral, evidence, one would expect 
courts in this situation to hold that the dominant owner has not ac-
quired an easement over the improved roadway. Unless the servient 
owner's failure to speak in response to his neighbor's improvement is 
itself treated as an implicit representation that the dominant owner 
may continue to use the improved roadway,74 the servient owner has 
made no promise or representation on which the dominant owner can 
claim to have relied. A number of courts have refused to find an ease-
ment by estoppel in this situation.75 
Tallarico v. Brett76 illustrates this position. The Bretts acquired 
an express twelve-foot wide easement over a described route across 
73. An analogous situation arises if a landowner who holds an easement appurtenant 
buys adjacent land and seeks to use the easement to serve that land. The land-
owner may allege that the servient owner made representations that induced the 
landowner to purchase the adjacent land, but the landowner might well have 
purchased the land not in reliance on the servient owner's representations, but in 
reliance on the mistaken belief that the terms of the easement permitted use for 
non-appurtenant land. Hence, the allegations of representations by the servient 
owner do not have a strong indicia of reliability. In cases like this, courts are 
unlikely to find the servient owner estopped from prohibiting use for non-appur-
tenant land. See Jordan v. Rash, 745 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. App. 1988, no writ). 
7 4. A number of courts have held that the servient owner has no duty to speak in this 
situation. See Storms v. Tuck, 579 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. 1979); Tallarico v. Brett, 400 
A.2d 959 (Vt. 1979). 
75. An analogous problem arises when a deed creating an easement provides that the 
easement will terminate if the dominant owner takes specified actions, and the 
servient owner then stands by and watches the dominant owner take those ac-
tions. At least one court has held that in that situation, the servient owner is not 
estopped to claim termination by the terms of the written instrument creating 
the easement. 
In Eis v. Meyer, 566 A.2d 422 (Conn. 1989), the deed creating the easement 
granted the dominant owner a right of way which would terminate when the 
dominant owner built any new buildings, or enlarged any existing buildings, on 
the dominant owner's land. The dominant owner informed the servient owner of 
his intent to build an addition to his kitchen. The servient owner, "consciously 
aware that the construction would be in violation of the easement, did not re-
spond or react when she was told of the plans." Id. at 423. The court held that 
the servient owner had no duty to inform the dominant owner of the conditions of 
the easement, or of her intention to enforce her rights under the easement. The 
court emphasized that the express terms of the easement were unambiguous. 
See id. at 425. 
76. 400 A.2d 959 (Vt. 1979). 
For another example, see Storms v. Tuck, 579 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. 1979). Tuck, 
who owned 1100 acres ofland, purchased three-quarters of an acre, together with 
a roadway easement across from the Storms' land. In language that was less 
than crystal clear, the original grant of the easement made the easement appur-
tenant to a ten-acre parcel of which the three-quarters of an acre was a part. 
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the Pearsons' neighboring land. At the time the Bretts acquired the 
easement, an existing roadway crossed the Brett-Pearson property 
line. The roadway's location deviated from the described easement by 
as much as four feet. Not knowing of the deviation, the Bretts began 
using the existing roadway, paved the portion on their own land, and 
erected a telephone pole immediately adjacent to the existing road-
way. They continued to use the roadway until the Pearsons' succes-
sors, the Tallaricos, sought to bar the Bretts from using the portion of 
the roadway that deviated from the described easement. The Vermont 
Supreme Court rejected the Bretts' claim that they had acquired an 
easement by estoppel over the existing roadway. The court held that 
the Pearsons' acquiescence and silence was insufficient to create an 
estoppel, especially because the Bretts' deed gave them notice of the 
easement's proper location. 77 
On the other hand, if the estoppel doctrine were designed primarily 
to enforce a neighbor's duty to warn his neighbor about the parties' 
mutual rights in order to prevent the neighbor from making useless 
expenditures based on a mistaken understanding of those rights, one 
would expect courts to find easements by estoppel in this situation. In 
fact, there are cases to support this position. In Vrazel v. 
Skrabanek,78 a dominant owner had acquired a dedicated easement 
over the servient's land. The dominant owner leveled and graded a 
different roadway, and used it for more than 50 years. Meanwhile, the 
servient owner had blocked off the dedicated easement. The court 
held that the dominant owner had not obtained a prescriptive ease-
ment over the leveled roadway because the initial use had been per-
missive. Instead, the court held that the dominant owner had 
obtained an easement by estoppel over that roadway. 79 In particular, 
Tuck then paved the entire three-quarters of an acre, and the roadway easement, 
at a total cost of $6,000, in the apparent expectation that he could use the road-
way to service his 1100 acres. After the roadway was built, the Storms objected, 
and Tuck claimed an easement by estoppel. In rejecting Tuck's claim, the court 
concluded that the Storms had no duty to speak out and protest the building of 
the road. See id. at 449. There, however, the Storms brought an action to protest 
the road within three weeks after Tuck first bought the three-quarters acre. Per-
haps, then, the court concluded that it would have been unfair to estop the 
Storms from bringing their claim when they had little practical opportunity to 
sue before they did. 
77. See Tallarico v. Brett, 400 A.2d 959, 963-64 (Vt. 1979). Specifically, the court 
wrote: 
"There is no breach of duty or culpability ... associated with a failure to disclose 
information already in the possession of the party asserting the estoppel." Id. at 
964. 
78. 725 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. 1987). 
79. See id. at 712. Indeed, had it not been for statements in earlier Texas opinions, 
particularly Othen v. Rosier, 226 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. 1950), it appears likely that 
the court in Vrazel would have held that Vrazel had acquired an easement by 
prescription. The jury had found adverse use by Vrazel' s predecessor for more 
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the court suggested that when a servient owner acquiesces in a change 
of easement location, the servient owner may be estopped to claim the 
former location to be the true one.so 
C. The Restatement 
The Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) appears to recog-
nize that an express oral promise is not necessary for creation of a 
servitude by estoppel. The Restatement includes two provisions deal-
ing with creation by estoppel. First, Section 2.9, entitled "Exception to 
the Statute of Frauds," provides that the consequences of failure to 
comply with the statute of frauds does not apply if the servitude's ben-
eficiary, in reliance on the servitude, "has so changed position that 
injustice can be avoided only by giving effect to the parties' intent to 
create a servitude."s1 The references to the "parties' intent" and the 
statute of frauds indicates that the drafters have in mind express 
promises. 
By contrast, section 2.10 of the same Restatement, entitled "Crea-
tion by Estoppel," does not appear to require an express promise. Sec-
tion 2.10 permits creation of a servitude to avoid injustice when an 
"owner or occupier permitted another to use ... land under circum-
stances in which it was reasonable to foresee that the user would sub-
stantially change position believing that the permission would not be 
revoked."82 Thus, the Restatement appears to endorse the (somewhat 
controversial) position that a landowner has a duty to warn a neighbor 
that no servitude exists if the neighbor would have reason to believe, 
from the landowner's actions, that a servitude does, in fact, exist. 
IV. TERMINATION OF SERVITUDES 
When a servient owner makes expenditures on his own land which 
make it impossible for the dominant owner to use an easement, the 
servient owner often argues that because the dominant owner did not 
immediately object to the servient owner's improvements, the ease-
than 10 years, but the Texas appellate courts held that the use had been both 
permissive and non-exclusive. In other states, the same use would have entitled 
Vrazel to a prescriptive easement, making it unnecessary to stretch the estoppel 
doctrine to protect Vrazel. 
80. See Vrazel v. Skrabanek, 725 S.W.2d at 712 (citing Dortch v. Sherman County, 
212 S.W.2d 1018, 1021 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948, no writ)). 
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.9 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 
1989). 
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY SERVITUDES § 2.10 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 
1989). Section 2.10(2) provides for creation by estoppel when the owner or occu-
pier represents that a servitude exists under circumstances where it was reason-
able to foresee reliance. 
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ment was terminated by estoppel.83 These estoppel claims are rarely 
successful. Their high failure rate suggests strongly that estoppel doc-
trine operates primarily to enforce explicit promises or those implied 
from the nature of the parties' relationship. 
When one landowner builds a roadway across a neighbor's land, 
the neighbor is unlikely to be ignorant of the roadway. If the neighbor 
does not object, courts are likely to assume that the failure to object 
reflects an understanding between the parties, an understanding that 
estops the neighbor from objecting after the fact. By contrast, when 
the owner of land subject to an easement makes expenditures that 
obstruct the easement, the dominant owner's failure to object need not 
reflect any understanding between the parties. The dominant owner 
may be unaware of the servient owner's "improvements," perhaps be-
cause, without commissioning a survey, he does not realize that the 
improvements obstruct his easement. In such cases, courts do not 
generally hold the easement terminated by estoppel, because the im-
provements provide uncertain evidence that the dominant owner un-
derstood he was relinquishing any rights. 
For example, in Mueller v. Hoblyn,B4 Hoblyn's deed described pre-
cisely a 20-foot easement across Mueller's property.as Hoblyn and his 
83. See Bache v. Owens, 929 P.2d 217 (Mont. 1996); Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500 
(Wyo. 1994). 
Moreover, the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes provides for modi-
fication or termination by estoppel in section 7.6, which provides: 
A servitude is modified or extinguished when the person holding the 
benefit of the servitude communicates to the party burdened by the ser-
vitude, by conduct, words, or silence, an intention to modify or terminate 
the servitude under circumstances in which it was reasonable to foresee 
that the burdened party would substantially change position on the ba-
sis of that communication, and the burdened party did substantially and 
detrimentally change position in reasonable reliance on that 
communication. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7.6 (Tentative Draft No. 6, 
1987). Comment (a) to the section provides that "courts should be cautious in 
applying estoppel, particularly where the servitude in question is of substantial 
value to the dominant estate." RESTATEMENT (Torno) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES 
§ 7.6 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1997). 
84. 887 P.2d 500 (Wyo. 1994); see also Bache v. Owens, 929 P.2d 217 (Mont. 
1996)(finding that where defendant constructed a building atop plaintiffs road-
way easement construction of the building did not terminate the easement by 
estoppel). 
85. In fact, it appears that neither Mueller, the servient owner, nor the servient 
owner's predecessor, ever specified the location of the easement. The deed to 
Mueller's predecessor created an easement not to exceed 20 feet in width, "which 
shall be fenced by [dominant owner]." Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d at 503. The 
deed to Mueller was expressly made "[s]ubject to easements of record." Id. Only 
in a deed from the original dominant owner to a predecessor of Hoblyn was the 
easement location specified. See id. The court nevertheless assumed, without 
discussion, that the easement specified in the deed to Hoblyn was binding on 
Mueller. Perhaps the court concluded that the provision in the original deed giv-
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predecessors assumed that the described easement corresponded to a 
dirt road that the original dominant owner had used for access. When 
snow drifts made access to the described easement difficult, Hoblyn 
had the land surveyed, and discovered that the dirt road did not corre-
spond to the described easement. When Mueller refused to give 
Hoblyn access to the described easement, Hoblyn sought to quiet title 
to the easement, and Mueller, who had drilled a water well within the 
easement boundaries, contended that the easement had been termi-
nated by adverse possession, by abandonment, and by estoppel. The 
Wyoming Supreme Court rejected all three contentions. In rejecting 
the estoppel claim, the court emphasized the absence of evidence that 
Hoblyn had ever expressed permission for Mueller to take actions in-
consistent with the continued existence of the easement.86 
Moreover, in those cases where the dominant owner has expressed 
an intention to relinquish rights to an easement, the estoppel doctrine 
is essentially irrelevant, because the servient owner has another doc-
trinal avenue for terminating the easement: abandonment. Courts 
have long held that abandonment terminates an easement, even with-
out a writing. If a servient owner can establish that a dominant 
owner has abandoned an easement, it is unnecessary to show that the 
servient owner has relied on the dominant owner's action; non-use and 
intent to abandon is enough.87 
The result, then, is that if the dominant owner stops using an ease-
ment without any understanding that she is relinquishing rights to 
the easement, the lack of an understanding between the parties pre-
cludes termination by estoppel even if the servient owner has made 
significant expenditures. By contrast, if the dominant owner stops us-
ing the easement with an understanding that she is relinquishing 
rights, reliance is unnecessary because a court can hold that she aban-
doned the easement. Hence, there is little cause for courts to invoke 
the estoppel doctrine to terminate easements. 
Sometimes, instead of the servient owner invoking the estoppel 
doctrine as a basis for terminating an easement, the dominant owner 
ing the dominant owner power to fence the easement effectively gave the domi-
nant owner the right to choose any location he wished, a right the dominant 
owner exercised not by using a dirt road, but by specifying the location in a deed 
to its successor. 
86. See id. at 506. 
87. See Nahabedian v. Jarcho, 510 A.2d 425, 429 (R.I. 1986) (distinguishing between 
termination by estoppel and termination by abandonment, while noting that both 
require "conduct on the part of the dominant owner evidencing an intent not to 
make further use of the easement," while only estoppel requires proof of reliance; 
court concludes that easement was terminated by abandonment). Of course, non-
use alone does not establish abandonment without some further evidence of in-
tent to abandon. See, e.g., Sabino Town & Country Estates Ass'n v. Carr, 920 
P.2d 26 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996)(rejecting abandonment claim and claim that aban-
donment estopped dominant owner from claiming easement). 
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invokes estoppel to prevent termination. The issue arises when the 
document creating the easement provides that the easement will ter-
minate upon the occurrence of a specified condition. If the servient 
owner knows that the dominant owner is about to take action which 
would trigger termination of the easement, but does not warn the 
dominant owner that the action will terminate the easement, should 
the servient owner be estopped from contending that the easement 
was terminated once the dominant owner has acted? 
An illustration of the problem is found in Eis v. Meyer.BB In addi-
tion to a main entrance to their home, dominant owners had an ease-
ment to reach the back of their home across a roadway that bisected 
servient owner's parcel. The instrument creating the easement speci-
fied that the easement would terminate when the dominant owner 
built any new building, or enlarged any existing building. Dominant 
owners, in a chance conversation, informed the servient owner of their 
plans to construct an addition to their kitchen. The servient owner 
said nothing. When the dominant owners completed the addition, the 
servient owner sought termination of the easement. The dominant 
owners argued that the servient owner was estopped to seek termina-
tion. The Connecticut Supreme Court disagreed, holding that because 
the dominant and servient owners had equal access to knowledge 
about the terms of the easement, the dominant owners' "disregard of 
the conditions clearly expressed in a recorded document was not a nat-
ural consequence of the [servient owner's] silence."B9 That is, because 
the dominant owners did not know about the termination clause at all, 
and would have built the kitchen addition even if the dominant own-
ers had never conversed with the servient owner, the dominant own-
ers did not act in reliance on any representation made by the servient 
owner.90 
The court's conclusion in Eis v. Meyer, and in like cases, is consis-
tent with the promise-based view of estoppel doctrine. In cases like 
Eis, it is clear that dominant owner acted in reliance on a mistaken 
belief that the easement would continue. Yet that reliance is not 
88. 566 A.2d 422 (Conn. 1989). 
89. Id. at 425. 
90. See also Maletis, Inc. v. Schmitt Forge, Inc., 870 P.2d 865, 868 (Or. Ct. App. 
1994)(rejecting argument that the servient owner is estopped from invoking ter-
mination clause, court wrote: "Plaintiffs did not know about the termination 
clause. Therefore, ·they could not be misled by defendant's delay into believing 
that defendant would not exercise its rights under the clause."). · But cf Erie-
Haven, Inc. v. First . Church of Christ, 292 N.E.2d 837, 842 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1973)(holding that trial court improperly granted summary judgment to the ser-
vient owner on dominant owner's claim that the servient owner was estopped 
from seeking termination; concluding that "[e)quitable estoppel may arise from 
silence as well as from. positive conduct. For silence to give rise to equitable es-
toppel, there must not only be an opportunity to speak, but an imperative duty to 
do so."). 
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enough to invoke estoppel doctrine in the absence of a representation 
by servient owner that dominant owner's improvements would not 
trigger termination. Instead, courts assume that the servient owner 
acted based on a mistaken view of the writing, and that alone, in the 
absence of a promise by the servient owner, is insufficient to estop the 
servient owner from terminating the easement.91 
V. BOUNDARY DISPUTES 
When neighbors discover that the boundaries they have recognized 
on the ground do not correspond to the boundaries described in their 
deeds, the landowner who has been occupying more land than her 
deed describes may invoke the estoppel doctrine to prevent her neigh-
bor from insisting on the record boundaries. Estoppel, however, is not 
the only weapon in the landowner's arsenal. She might also claim ti-
tle by adverse possession, or invoke the doctrine of "acquiescence," or 
the doctrine of "agreed boundaries," as a basis for conforming record 
title to the apparent boundary as it appears on the ground. Often, 
many of these doctrines are invoked together in the same case. As a 
result, the importance of the estoppel doctrine varies, in large mea-
sure, with the content of the jurisdiction's law of adverse possession, 
acquiescence, and agreed boundaries. If, for instance, a landowner 
cannot invoke the acquiescence doctrine until the statute of limita-
tions has passed, estoppel may be more important than if acquies-
cence is easier to establish. 
Moreover, although estoppel is most often invoked against the rec-
ord owner, there are occasions on which the record owner seeks to es-
top a neighbor from claiming title to a disputed boundary strip by 
adverse possession, or by a related doctrine. These two uses of estop-
pel merit separate analysis. 
A. Estoppel Against a True Owner 
1. By the True Owner's Representations 
Suppose one landowner asks his neighbor about the location of the 
boundary between the two parcels. The neighbor indicates that the 
boundary is within a foot or two of a row of trees, and confirms the 
same boundary line on subsequent occasions. The landowner then 
makes substantial improvements on "his" side of the row of trees, only 
91. Judicial treatment of this problem resembles treatment of the dominant owner 
who mistakenly improves an easement over a route different from that specified 
in the writing creating the easement. In the absence of an express representation 
by the servient owner that the dominant owner is entitled to use the wrong route, 
courts assume that the dominant owner acted on a mistaken reading of the ease-
ment, and that the estoppel doctrine should not, therefore, be available. See 
supra text accompanying notes 59-63. 
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to learn that the improvements lie on the neighbor's land. Adverse 
possession will not help the landowner unless the neighbor fails to ob-
ject for the statutory period. Courts, however, typically hold that the 
neighbor's representations, together with landowner's reliance on 
those representations, estop the neighbor from insisting on the record 
boundary. 92 
Estoppel doctrine operates against a record owner who represents 
that a particular line is in fact the boundary, and also against a record 
owner who represents that he will treat a particular line as the bound-
ary, regardless of the boundary's actual location. In Burkey v. 
Baker,93 the record owner told his future neighbor that the boundary 
line was within a foot of a line of trees-a representation about the 
actual boundary. In contrast in Grunden u. Hurley,94 the record 
owner told his neighbor "[w]e'll move this fence over so you'll have 
some room in that yard"-a representation made without regard to 
the actual boundary.95 In each case, the court held that the record 
owner's representation estopped him from insisting on the record 
boundary when his neighbor relied on that representation. 
Of course, if the court is not convinced that the record owner has 
made a representation about the mutual boundary, it will be much 
more difficult for a neighbor to prevail on an estoppel claim.96 More-
over, if the trial court has found that the record owner made no repre-
sentation, an appellate court is not likely to overturn that 
determination. 97 
A representation will not estop the record owner from claiming rec-
ord boundaries unless the neighbor can show reliance on the represen-
tation.98 The clearest case of reliance occurs when the record owner 
asks a neighbor to expend money on the disputed land, the neighbor 
92. See Grunden v. Hurley, 736 P.2d 548 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987); Douglass v. Rowland, 
540 S.W.2d 252 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976); Burkey v. Baker, 492 P.2d 563 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1971); cf. Halverson v. Village of Deerwood, 322 N.W.2d 761 (Minn. 
1982)(involving representation by village mayor). 
93. 492 P.2d 563 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). 
94. 736 P .2d 548 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987). 
95. Id. at 548-49. 
96. See, e.g., Milliken v. Buswell, 313 A.2d 111 (Me. 1973)(involving record owner 
that agreed to help neighbor move building, in part to preserve view of record 
owner's neighboring commercial building from highway; when record owner 
helped move building, and new location sits on boundary between the two par-
cels, court found record owner is not estopped because the parties had not dis-
cussed boundary lines). See discussion section V.B infra. 
97. See, e.g., Nelson v. Wagner, 700 P .2d 973 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985)(declining to over-
turn trial finding that, although record owner made false representation about 
boundary, record owner had also told purchaser and future neighbor that he in-
tended to sell property only by legal description). 
98. See, e.g ., Brewer v. Lawson, 569 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978)(finding no 
estoppel where possessor knew record-owner's assertion was false and took no 
actions based on the false assertion). 
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does so, and the record owner then seeks to eject the neighbor from 
that land. For example, in Douglass v. Rowland,99 the record owner, 
concerned that his neighbor's improvements were creating drainage 
problems, had his lawyer send his neighbor a letter requesting neigh-
bor to build a concrete retaining wall. Record owner sent neighbor a 
survey, and indicated where the retaining wall should be built. 
Neighbor complied, but six months later, record owner, having com-
missioned a new survey, sought to eject neighbor from the land on 
which the retaining wall had been built. The court held record owner 
estopped from asserting a new boundary, observing that "the only rea-
son in the world" that the record owner sent the survey to the neigh-
bor was to induce the neighbor to build the retaining wall.100 
Similarly, neighbor had no reason to build the wall other than to sat-
isfy his neighbor's concerns. 
Of course, a neighbor can show reliance even if the record owner 
has made no express request for the neighbor to take action. In partic-
ular, courts are willing to assume reliance when the neighbor makes 
substantial improvements on land that lies within the boundaries de-
scribed by the record owner.101 The record owner's representation is a 
but-for cause of the improvement; no landowner would readily make 
improvements on a neighbor's land without some assurance that she 
would recoup the value of the improvement. By contrast, when the 
improvements are not on the disputed property, courts find no evi-
dence of detrimental reliance; the improvements might have been 
made regardless of any representations.102 
Finally, even if a record owner would otherwise be estopped by his 
representations, and by the ensuing reliance, courts are reluctant to 
permit a record owner's representations to estop a successor-in-inter-
est.1oa The reluctance, however, is not absolute. If a successor-in-in-
terest has notice of the earlier statements, estoppel may operate 
against successors.104 
99. 540 S.W.2d 252 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976). 
100. See id. at 255. 
101. See Grunden v. Hurley, 736 P .2d 548 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987) (including driveway, 
swing sets, garden); Burkey v. Baker, 492 P.2d 563 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971)(includ-
ing wooden bulkhead, boat ramp, boat hoist, tent platform). 
102. See Evans v. Forte, 510 So. 2d 327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). 
103. See Madsen v. Holmes, 203 N.W.2d 865, 869 (Wis. 1973) (holding that successors 
not bound by knowledge and representations of their grantor, at least unless they 
knew, at the time of purchase, the facts which would operate to bar their claim). 
104. See, e.g., Grunden v. Hurley, 736 P.2d 548 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987)(holding current 
record owner bound by statements made by record owner's grandfather). 
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2. By Physical Barriers and Improvements Without 
Representations 
791 
What if the record owner makes no explicit representation that a 
fence or other physical marker is the boundary between parcels? His 
neighbor, assuming that the physical boundary is in fact the bound-
ary, makes improvements up to the physical barrier-improvements 
that encroach on the record owner's land. Is the record owner es-
topped to dispute the physical barrier as the boundary? Two situa-
tions recur. In the first, the neighbor makes improvements after the 
record owner has expressly informed the neighbor that improvements 
would encroach, but the neighbor improves anyway. In that situation, 
courts uniformly hold that the record owner is not estopped to assert 
title to the record boundary. In this situation, the improving neighbor 
has not acted in reliance on any representation by the record owner, 
because the only representation made by the record owner is no more 
reassuring than "proceed at your own risk."105 
In Smithers v. Hagerman,106 record owner "eyeballed" the bound-
ary and built a fence that did not enclose all of the record owner's 
land. Later, neighbor surveyed the land, and discovered that neigh-
bor's own land did not run up to the fence.107 Neighbor asked the 
record owner to sign a boundary agreement which would provide that 
neighbor's land ran up to the fence. Record owner refused to sign the 
agreement. When neighbor's tenant started building a garage which 
encroached on record owner's land, record owner immediately notified 
tenant of the encroachment, and tenant, in turn, notified neighbor. 
Tenant nevertheless completed a garage, and neighbor later built a 
septic system, which also encroached on record owner's land. Record 
owner brought an action demanding that neighbor remove the en-
croachments. In rejecting neighbor's estoppel claim, the Montana 
Supreme Court emphasized that neighbor had failed to establish any 
facts which would show misrepresentation or concealment by record 
owner.1os Moreover, iri light of record owner's refusal to agree to ad-
105. Cf DeLong, supra note 4, at 1007-08 (clarifying that explicit disclaimers of prom-
issory liability are generally given effect). 
106. 797 P.2d 177 (Mont. 1990). 
107. Id. at 179. 
108. See also Herrmann v. Woodell, 693 P.2d 1118, 1124 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (re-
jecting estoppel claim where neighbor met with record owner to try to purchase 
easement through disputed property and record owner refused); Grant v. Warren 
Bros. Co., 405 A.2d 213, 217 (Me. 1979)(finding no estoppel to claim to record 
boundary where record owner says to neighbor "You say the line's up there and I 
say that's not right"); Steel Creek Dev. Corp. v. Smith, 268 S.E.2d 205, 211 (N.C. 
1980)(finding no estoppel to claim of record boundary when neighbor builds and 
informed record own!)r where he planned to build a boathouse, and record owner 
said "[y)ou're going to have to cut this thing in two right here"); Kronawetter v. 
Tamoshan, Inc., 545 P.2d 1230 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976)(rejecting estoppel claim 
when improver built bulkhead after record owner's surveyor informed him that 
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just the boundaries, none of neighbor's expenditures were in reliance 
on any action by record owner. 
In cases like Smithers, the improving neighbor makes expendi-
tures knowing that the record owner claims title to the disputed 
boundary area. In a second situation, the neighbor invokes estoppel 
when the record owner has taken no steps to indicate that she ques-
tions the fence, or other physical boundary, as the dividing line be-
tween the two parcels. Sometimes, neighbors invoke estoppel even 
without making any expenditures in supposed reliance on the physical 
boundary. Courts routinely reject these estoppel claims.109 Long-
term acceptance of a well-marked boundary may displace the record 
boundary by "acquiescence, "110 but in the absence of improvements, 
estoppel claims inevitably fail. 
Where a physical boundary appears to divide two parcels, and one 
of the neighbors makes improvements in reliance on the belief that 
the physical boundary is the correct one, an estoppel claim would ap-
pear to have more appeal. One might conclude that the record owner, 
by not objecting to the improvements, has made an implied represen-
tation that the physical boundary is correct. Norms of neighborly be-
havior might require the record owner to warn a neighbor before the 
neighbor makes expenditures in the belief that the physical boundary 
is the correct one. Nevertheless, courts are generally hostile to estop-
pel claims when the record owner has made no express representa-
tions about the boundary line. Sometimes, the hostility reflects 
judicial recognition that the particular landowner could have made no 
timely objection because the landowner lived out of town and would 
improvements were on disputed strip); Miller v. Stovall, 717 P.2d 798, 807 (Wyo. 
1986), overruled by Ferguson Ranch Inc. v. Murray, 811 P.2d 287 (Wyo. 1991)(re-
jecting estoppel claim where record owner twice tore down fence neighbor tried to 
erect between parcels; court concluded that actions showed that record owner 
"openly disputed [neighbor' s) contention as to the boundary"). 
109. See Sceirine v. Densmore, 479 P.2d 779 (Nev. 1971)(finding no estoppel because 
record owner's neighbor did not adversely change position); Rautenberg v. Mun-
nis, 226 A.2d 770 (N.H. 1967)(involving parties who did not use the parcel, which 
was swampy in nature); Dodds v. Lagan, 595 P.2d 452 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979)(find-
ing that mere fact that adjoining owners have treated a line as the boundary does 
not estop them from claiming the true line). 
110. Acquiescence is not always available to settle boundaries merely because a physi-
cal boundary has been marked for a long period of time. In a number of jurisdic-
tions, acquiescence requires that the boundary be settled for a period as long as 
the statute of limitations. See, e.g ., Rautenberg, 226 A.2d at 772 (requiring 20 
years). In other jurisdictions, acquiescence is only available if the party claiming 
title to the marked boundary can show that the boundary was intended to resolve 
a dispute between the parties. See, e.g., Sceirine, 479 P.2d at 781 ("No evidence 
was shown from which we can imply that a dispute as to the boundary location 
existed."). 
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have been unaware of any encroaching improvements.111 At other 
times, however, the hostility appears to be premised on a norm that a 
landowner acts at his own peril if he makes improvements without 
checking with his neighbor or conducting a survey.112 The underlying 
principle appears to be this: because of the. inherent difficulty of 
matching record boundaries with physical ones, the record owner 
should not be presumed to know precisely where his boundary is, nor 
should he be required to bear the expense of checking merely because 
his neighbor has started to make improvements near the apparent 
boundary. Hence, the record owner's silence in the face of improve-
ments should not be treated as an implied representation about the 
location of the boundary (or as a breach of the record owner's duty to 
warn the neighbor), but rather as a manifestation of the record 
owner's ignorance about the boundary's precise location. And in the 
absence of a representation, the record owner should not be estopped 
from later insisting on record boundaries. 
The judicial focus in boundary dispute cases on the actions taken 
by the record owner which might lead the neighbor to make expendi-
tures on the record owner's land, not on the expenditures themselves, 
is consistent with a tort-based "duty to warn" approach to estoppel. If 
the record owner has little reason to know that his neighbor is putting 
himself in jeopardy, the record owner has no duty to warn the neigh-
bor about his predicament. 
B. Estoppel to Claim Adverse Possession 
When a neighbor has occupied a record owner's land for long 
enough to establish title by adverse possession, the record owner occa-
sionally contends that the neighbor's statements or actions should es-
top the neighbor from claiming title by adverse possession. If the 
neighbor makes statements acknowledging the record owner's title 
before the adverse possession period has expired, the record owner has 
no need to invoke the estoppel doctrine, because the neighbor's actions 
are inconsistent with the "hostility" or "claim of title" necessary to es-
tablish title by adverse possession.113 When, however, the neighbor 
111. See Hadlock v. Poutre, 423 A.2d 835, 837 (Vt. 1980)(noting that record owners 
"lived out-of-state and did not know that the defendants were building a barn. A 
party is not estopped by science unless he knows of his rights."). 
112. See Brown v. Clemens, 338 S.E.2d 338 (S.C. 1985)(improving neighbor had 
means of knowledge to determine boundary location before building encroach-
ments); Buza v. Wojtalewicz, 180 N.W.2d 556, 561 (Wis. 1970)(finding that im-
proving landowner "had an affirmative duty to locate his true boundaries and 
stay within them"). 
113. See, e.g., Dillaha v. Temple, 590 S.W.2d 331 (Ark. Ct. App. 1979); Van Gorder v. 
Masterplanned, Inc. , 585 N.E.2d 375 (N.Y. 1991). Note that in cases like these, 
the record owner might well rely on the neighbor's statements by failing to bring 
an ejectment action against the possessor. Hence, if the hostility or claim of right 
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makes statements after expiration of the adverse possession period, 
estoppel claims typically fail because the record owner can show no 
reliance on the statements. 
For example, in Kline v. Kramer,114 twenty-five years after a fence 
was constructed on what appeared to be the common boundary, neigh-
bor allegedly indicated to the record owners the surveyor's stakes 
which indicated the true boundary line between the parcels. Record 
owners contended that neighbor's statements should estop neighbor 
from claiming title by adverse possession, even though the statements 
were made long after the ten-year adverse possession period had ex-
pired. The court rejected record owners' argument, noting that record 
owners had not revealed the manner in which they had relied on 
neighbor's acknowledgment of the surveyor stakes.115 
Finally, even if estoppel claims might succeed against the posses-
sor who has made the initial representation to the record owner, 
courts have been unwilling to hold that estoppel claims birid succes-
sors-in-interest without notice of the representation. Thus, where an 
ancient fence appears to separate two parcels, the purchaser of the 
encroaching parcel is not bound by his seller's representation that the 
seller will abide by the record boundary.11s 
requirements were not enough to defeat the neighbor's adverse possession claim, 
the record owner might be able to invoke estoppel against the neighbor. 
Of course, if the court concludes that the neighbor made no representations to 
the record owner, then courts are likely to find the requisite hostility to establish 
title by adverse possession, and the absence of any representation will preclude 
any estoppel claim by the record owner. For example, in Meier v. Rieger, 954 P.2d 
786 (Or. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, 966 P.2d 222 (Or. 1998), the record owners 
told the adverse possessor that boundary lines on both sides of her property were 
incorrect. The adverse possessor moved the fence to enclose additional property 
on one side, but retained existing fence-which encroached on the record owner's 
land-on the other side. The court rejected the record owner's argument that the 
adverse possessor's actions amounted to a representation that she would accede 
to record boundaries; it found that the adverse possessor had established hostile 
possession, and that the adverse possessor was not estopped to assert an adverse 
possession claim. See id. at 791. 
114. 386 N.E.2d 987 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979). 
115. See id. at 487. In addition, in Evans v. Wittorff, 869 S.W.2d 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1994), after the adverse possession period had expired, the neighbor allegedly 
told the record owner that if she surveyed the property, he would recognize the 
survey line. The record owner did nothing for five years, but later surveyed the 
property and discovered that the existing fence enclosed 43 acres of "her" land. 
The court rejected the record owner's estoppel argument, holding that estoppel 
would not run against the original neighbor's successor, who had purchased with-
out notice, after the neighbor had made his original representation. The court 
also held, however, that any reliance was unreasonable since it did not occur un-
til five years after the neighbor made his representation. Moreover, the court did 
not indicate what reliance the record owner had established-other than simply 
commissioning the survey. See id. at 875-76. 
116. See Evans v. Wittorff, 869 S.W.2d 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). 
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VI. LANDLORD-TENANT LAW 
When a landlord and tenant agree to lease premises for longer 
than a year, the statute of frauds generally requires that the lease be 
in writing.117 Nevertheless, even when the parties have a written 
lease, the ongoing nature of the landlord-tenant relationship naturally 
leads to oral exchanges between the parties. In a variety of circum-
stances, these exchanges lead to estoppel claims by one party against 
another. This section examines the judicial reaction to a number of 
those claims. · 
A. Lease Renewal 
Lease agreements often give a tenant an option to renew for one or 
more additional periods upon expiration of the original lease, or an 
option to purchase at some point during the lease. Typically, the 
agreement provides a formal mechanism for a tenant to follow in exer-
cising the renewal option. If, however, landlord makes statements 
which lead tenant to believe that tenant need not take the steps enu-
merated in the lease agreement, landlord may face an estoppel claim 
by tenant. Courts are generally receptive to these estoppel claims.118 
Other leases include no option to renew. Nevertheless, a tenant 
may contend that landlord has made a statement which led tenant to 
believe that the lease had been renewed. In this situation, too, a ten-
ant sometimes advances an estoppel claim. These estoppel claims 
tend not to be successful. 
1. Leases Which Include Option to Renew or Purchase 
When a lease gives a tenant an option to renew at a stated price, or 
an option to purchase at a stated price, the option represents a signifi-
cant portion of the consideration for the lease. If that option turns out 
to be valuable, and if tenant does not exercise the option in accordance 
with the terms of the lease, courts are receptive to the argument that 
landlord made statements or took actions that induced tenant not to 
117. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 125(4) cmt. b (1981)(indicating that 
in most states oral leases are valid only if for a term not longer than one year). 
118. Sometimes it is the landlord who invokes estoppel to bind the tenant to a renewal 
term. For instance, in HLM Realty Corporation u. Morreale , 477 N.E.2d 394 
(Mass. 1985), the lease gave the tenant an option to renew at a rent to be deter-
mined in arbitration. The tenant timely exercised its renewal option, and then 
vacated the premises before the renewal term began and before arbitration com-
menced. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the lessee was not bound to pay 
rent for the renewal term. The court held that neither party became obligated to 
a renewal lease by the terms of the original agreement until the arbitration pro-
cess was completed. The court then held that the tenant was not estopped from 
denying the renewal because the tenant had taken no steps to induce the land-
lord not to proceed with arbitration, nor had the landlord failed to proceed as a 
consequence of the tenant's departure from the premises. See id. at 395-96. 
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exercise, and that those statements or actions caused tenant's failure 
to exercise. 
. To take the most obvious case, iflandlord explicitly (but orally) as-
sures tenant that he need not exercise the option by its expiration 
date, courts typically hold landlord estopped from refusing to renew 
when tenant does not exercise on time.119 Even iflandlord makes no 
explicit representation, however, some courts have held landlord es-
topped from refusing a lease renewal iflandlord knew tenant intended 
to renew and took no steps to assure that tenant took the formal ac-
tions necessary to renew_ 120 
119. See Goldstein v. Hanna, 635 P.2d 290 (Nev. 1981)(holding that landlord was es-
topped from asserting that tenant's option to purchase had expired when land-
lord's agent assured tenant that option would continue in effect for several 
months); CVG Shops, Inc. v. Fifth Third Center Assocs. , No. C-960091, 1996 WL 
691449 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1996)(finding that landlord was estopped from re-
fusing to renew at market rate where lease provided for renewal at a rate to be 
negotiated, but not to exceed then current market rate; during renewal negotia-
tions, landlord's agent orally extended deadline for notification until negotiations 
were completed); New Empire Corp. v. Davidson, No. 80-1155, 1981 WL 138721 
(Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 1981)(holding that landlord was estopped from denying 
lease renewal where lease included option to renew for five years, parties orally 
agreed to two-year extension, and landlord's agent assured tenant that there was 
no need to sign the lease until tenant returned from Florida at the end of the 
winter). 
120. See Herbst v. Santa Monica Swim & Health Club, Inc., 238 Cal. Rptr. 790 (Ct. 
App. 1987)(holding landlord estopped to enforce written notice provision when 
landlord knew of major expenditures made by tenant within three years of re-
newal date, and when landlord accepted tenant's tax payment for a period ex-
tending beyond expiration of original lease and lease required 90-day written 
notice of intent to renew)(review denied, not published in official reporter and 
cannot be cited in California); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish, 293 S.E.2d 
749 (N.C. 1982)(holding landlord, and landlord's estate, estopped from insisting 
on written notice by implicit representation that oral notice would be adequate 
where landlord permitted tenant to exercise option orally in the past). But see 
Carsten v. Eickhoff, 323 N.E.2d 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that landlord 
was not estopped to deny renewal even though tenant had expended $750,000 for 
a stone crushing and processing plant to process stone from leased premises; 
court held that landlord had no duty to speak when tenant did not promptly re-
new, and also noted that landlord did not know that plant could not be operated 
feasibly without use of the leased premises). 
Of course, if there is insufficient evidence that the tenant intended to exercise 
the option to renew, the landlord will not be estopped to deny renewal. Thus, in 
Vuci v. Nathans, 357 So. 2d 561 (La. Ct. App. 1978), a tenant took a one year 
lease at an annual rental of $300, with an option to renew for an additional four-
year term at a rental of $500. The tenant did not exercise the option, but contin-
ued in possession at the end of the year, and paid the landlord rent of$300. The 
court concluded that the tenant's behavior was consistent with an intent to create 
a month-to-month lease rather than exercise the option to renew. See id. at 563; 
see also In re Joyner Oil Co., 74 B.R. 618 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1987)(finding that 
landlord was not estopped to deny renewal where bankrupt debtor failed to exer-
cise option to renew, and landlord had no notice of tenant' s supposed intent to 
renew); Sentara Enters. v. CCP Assocs., 413 S.E .2d 595 (Va. 1992)(holding land-
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Sometimes, the landlord alleges not that tenant's exercise of the 
renewal option was untimely, but that a person without authority pur-
ported to exercise the option. Here, too, if landlord takes action that 
leads tenant (or tenant's assigns or agents) to believe that exercise is 
proper, courts hold landlord estopped to deny renewaI.121 
Although courts are quick to invoke estoppel to protect tenants 
who have failed to exercise renewal options on time, courts might pro-
tect tenants threatened with loss of renewal rights even if landlord 
played no role in tenant's failure to renew. Some courts, for instance, 
have held forthrightly that a tenant's failure to exercise renewal 
rights on time-even if the failure results from the tenant's own inat-
tention or carelessness-should be excused if landlord is not 
prejudiced by tenant's delay.122 These courts invoke principles like 
"equity abhors a forfeiture" to protect tenant renewal rights.123 When 
courts strain to attribute tenant delay to representations made by a 
landlord, they may be accomplishing covertly the same objectives real-
ized by other courts more directly. Hence, one might suspect that the 
estoppel label in this class of cases has little to do with a landlord's 
representations. Instead, when courts invoke estoppel, they appear to 
be holding that landlord and tenant are enmeshed in a relationship 
that obligates landlord to warn tenant of the potential loss of a valua-
ble renewal option. As is generally the case with the duty to warn, 
there is far from universal agreement about the existence or scope of 
that obligation. 
2. Leases Which Do Not Include Renewal Options 
Even when a lease includes no renewal option, a tenant and land-
lord may have oral discussions about extending or renewing the lease 
at the expiration of the term. When the lease includes a renewal op-
lord not estopped to deny renewal when tenant forgot to send renewal notice and 
where tenant had not made improvements or taken other steps to put landlord on 
notice of an intent to renew). 
121. See Billman v. V.I. Equities Corp., 743 F.2d 1021, 1024 (3rd Cir. 1984)(holding 
landlord waived right to object to exercise; court concluded that the genre of 
waiver is "akin to promissory estoppel"); Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P.2d 85 
(Utah 1975) (holding landlord who, by action, indicated acceptance of notice as an 
effective exercise is estopped from objecting to exercise). 
122. See, e.g., Aickin v. Ocean View Invs. Co., 935 P.2d 992 (Haw. 1997); J .N.A. Realty 
v. Cross Bay Chelsea, Inc., 366 N.E.2d 1313, 1316 (N.Y. 1977)(permitting tenant 
to renew lease even though tenant, as a result of its own carelessness, missed the 
deadline for exercising the renewal option). 
123. See J .N.A. Realty v. Cross Bay Chelsea, Inc., 366 N.E.2d at 1316 ("an equitable 
interest is recognized and protected against forfeiture in some cases where the 
tenant has in good faith made improvements of a substantial character, in-
tending to renew the lease, if the landlord is not harmed by the delay in the 
giving of the notice and the lessee would sustain substantial loss in case the lease 
were not renewed"). 
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tion, the option generally specifies the terms of the renewal lease; 
when the lease includes no option, renewal frequently involves adjust-
ments to various terms, including, but not limited to, the rent term. If 
discussions between a landlord and tenant lead to an executed re-
newal lease, no statute of frauds or estoppel problems generally arise. 
Suppose, however, renewal discussions do not generate an executed 
lease. A disappointed tenant may claim that landlord orally repre-
sented that the lease would be renewed, and that landlord's represen-
tation should estop landlord from refusing to renew. 
These estoppel claims are rarely successful. Tenant's most imme-
diate problem is establishing the content of landlord's representation. 
If the representation is oral, how can a court know what the new rent 
should be, or the terms of the new lease? Rarely does a tenant's sup-
posed reliance on landlord's representations clarify the terms of the 
supposed agreement. For instance, when tenant has made improve-
ments on the leased property after landlord's representation, it is 
often unclear what the useful life of the improvements might be or 
whether tenant might have made the improvements even if the new 
lease included a significant rent increase.124 Similarly, if landlord 
orally promises to renew the lease if tenant takes actions helpful to 
landlord, tenant's reliance-by taking those actions-does not estab-
lish the terms of the promised renewa1.125 Moreover, if tenant alleges 
that she relied by staying in the premises beyond the original lease 
term, the tenant's action of remaining on the premises is entirely con-
sistent with a holdover arrangement rather than a new lease term.126 
In cases like these, the actions taken by tenant might well have been 
taken without any lease renewal at all, and certainly without a re-
newal on the terms tenant alleges landlord promised. Hence, tenant's 
actions provide little corroboration of the supposed agreement. 
Indeed, even when a tenant's reliance is clear, courts have been 
hesitant to invoke estoppel when the content of landlord's promise is 
unclear. Peter E. Blum & Company v. First Bank Building Corpora-
124. See Cohen v. Brown, Harris, Stevens, Inc., 475 N.E.2d 116, 117 (N.Y. 1984)(re-
jecting estoppel claim despite tenants' allegation that they made thousands of 
dollars in improvements to rented maids' rooms based on alleged promise that 
tenants could continue renting the rooms for "so long as they desire and need to 
do so"; tenants certainly might have made improvements without assurance of 
perpetual lease, so the improvements themselves did not provide corroboration 
for any particular lease term, nor any particular rent). 
125. See Tribune Printing Co. v. 263 Ninth Ave. Realty, Inc., 444 N.E.2d 35 (N.Y. 
1982)(holding estoppel claim failed when landlord allegedly promised to renew 
tenant's lease if tenant wrote helpful letter to Industrial Development Agency in 
support of landlord's application). 
126. See Dixieland Food Stores, Inc. v. Geddert, 505 So. 2d 371 (Ala. 1987Xholding 
that continuing to pay rent provided for under old lease did not demonstrate reli-
ance on validity of new lease tenant himself had failed to execute). 
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tion 127 is illustrative. With about a year remaining on his existing 
lease, tenant received an offer from a neighboring tenant to take over 
that tenant's space. Tenant then asked lessor whether his lease would 
be renewed at expiration, and enclosed correspondence from the 
neighboring tenant. Tenant alleged that landlord's representative 
had confirmed that the lease would be renewed, and landlord's vice 
president wrote tenant a letter indicating that he was "glad ... [ten-
ant was] ... looking forward to remaining for many years to come."12s 
Tenant then discontinued negotiations with neighbor, and landlord 
later informed tenant that it would not renew the lease, but would 
offer another space at double the rent. In affirming the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment to landlord, the court held that landlord's 
letter was itself insufficient to estop landlord, and that landlord had 
no duty to deny statements made by tenant with respect to the alleged 
promise to renew. 
By contrast, where a writing itself corroborates tenant's allega-
tions of a promise to renew, courts may be more receptive to an estop-
pel claim. In Daehler v. Oggoian,12 9 the court held that the trial court 
had improperly stricken tenant's estoppel claim where tenant pro-
duced an unsigned lease with a prior landlord, tenant testified that his 
prior landlord had assured him that he had a new lease, and where 
successor landlord testified that he saw the tenant moving heavy ma-
chinery into the premises shortly before successor purchased the 
building, and shortly before expiration of the lease. In Daehler, the 
writing, together with tenant's actions, corroborated not only tenant's 
claim that prior landlord had made an enforceable promise to renew, 
but also the terms of the renewal lease. 
B. Estoppel by Acceptance of Rent 
When landlord accepts rent from tenant without taking steps to 
enforce a lease provision the tenant has previously breached, tenant 
may argue that the acceptance estops landlord from enforcing the 
lease provision. These cases do not fall into the typical estoppel pat-
tern. If tenant's violation of a lease occurs before landlord accepts 
rent, tenant cannot argue that landlord's acceptance induced tenant to 
violate the lease's terms. At best, tenant might argue that by ac-
cepting rent checks, landlord implicitly waived his right to enforce the 
lease provision (a claim tenant often appends to the estoppel 
claim).130 For tenant's estoppel claim to succeed, tenant would have 
to establish that she took some action after landlord's acceptance of 
127. 275 S.E.2d 751 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980). 
128. Id. at 753. 
129. 390 N.E.2d 417 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979). 
130. Often, however, the lease explicitly prohibits oral waiver of the terms of the lease, 
making waiver claims unattractive to tenant. 
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rent in reliance on the assumption that landlord had waived any right 
to take action against the lease violation. For many tenants, this is an 
insurmountable burden. 
Consider first cases in which a landlord seeks to recover possession 
because tenant's use of the premises is inconsistent with the terms of 
the lease, or with an applicable zoning ordinance. After learning of 
tenant's use, landlord continues to accept rent. What act can tenant 
allege that she has taken in reliance on landlord's acceptance? The 
only plausible act is that she persisted in the prohibited use, confident 
that landlord had waived any right to take action. On occasion, courts 
uphold a tenant's estoppel claim in this situation-holding that before 
seeking possession, landlord must make it clear to the tenant that the 
prohibited use will not be tolerated, and must give tenant an opportu-
nity to cure.131 If, however, the landlord has made clear and persis-
tent objections to tenant's use, acceptance of rent will not estop 
landlord from recovering possession.13 2 In these cases, landlord's ac-
ceptance of rent would not lull tenant into believing that landlord had 
waived the right to enforce the lease provision; hence, any expendi-
tures tenant subsequently made would not have been in reliance on 
any implied representation by the landlord. 
Next, consider the cases in which tenant has tendered, and land-
lord has accepted, rent checks in an amount which, according to land-
lord, is less than the total rent due under the lease. So long as 
landlord has consistently informed tenant that the rent tendered was 
not the amount due, acceptance does not generally estop landlord from 
seeking the balance. First, so long as landlord provides tenant with 
notice of its position, tenant cannot claim that landlord's action in-
duced any particular behavior on her behalf.133 Second, even if a ten-
131. For example, in Entrepreneur, Ltd. v. Yasuna, 498 A.2d 1151 (D.C. 1985), a ten-
ant failed to obtain a certificate of occupancy for business use of the premises. 
The court held that the landlord was estopped to invoke "unlawful purpose" cove-
nant in the lease when both parties had contemplated business use of the prem-
ises, and where the landlord had accepted rent knowing of the tenant's use. See 
id. at 1159-60. The court wrote: "Once the landlord has, by his conduct, in effect 
acquiesced in the breach of the lease covenant, he may stand on his legal right to 
enforce the covenant only if he gives notice of his intent to the tenant and an 
opportunity to cure the default prior to declaring a forfeiture." Id. at 1162. 
132. See Lewis v. Clothes Shack, Inc., 309 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Civ. Ct. 1970)(finding that 
landlord was not estopped from enforcing restrictions on storefront design even 
after acceptance of rent; court noted that all of landlord's actions reflected an 
intent to enforce the lease provision); Jordan v. Duprel, 303 N.W.2d 796 (S.D. 
1981)(holding that landlord was permitted to recover possession against tenant 
who had overgrazed land despite a lease provision prohibiting overgrazing and 
despite landlord's persistent request that tenant modify grazing practices; court 
rejected tenant's estoppel argument). 
133. See Stevens Hous. Co-op Iv. Guiffre, No. 40319-2-1, 1998 WL 129967 (Wash. Ct. 
App. Mar. 23, 1998)(rejecting estoppel claim when landlord's acceptances were 
accompanied by 3-day notices informing tenant of arrearage). 
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ant might erroneously believe that acceptance of rent signaled 
landlord's waiver of the right to collect more, it is difficult to imagine 
what reliance tenant might assert on landlord's implied representa-
tion: so long as tenant was bound under the lease to pay the higher 
rent, remaining on the premises would not constitute detrimental reli-
ance, but would instead constitute performance of the tenant's lease-
hold obligation. The situation is different when the rent dispute arises 
at the time for renewal. When tenant has an option to renew, the 
lease does not generally require tenant to renew; if the terms are un-
satisfactory, tenant may seek other premises. If tenant purports to 
renew the lease at a specified price-a price less than that specified in 
the renewal provisions of the original lease-landlord's acceptance of 
rent checks without any indication of an intent to adhere to the terms 
of the original lease might well induce reliance by tenant. For exam-
ple, tenant might stay, rather than seek new premises, in reliance on 
landlord's implied representation that the tendered rent was 
adequate. 
Altman v. Alaska Truss & Manufacturing Company134 is illustra-
tive. The initial sublease gave the subtenant an option to renew for an 
additional five years, and provided that the renewal rate would be es-
tablished by arbitration unless the parties agreed on a rate within 
forty-five days after exercise of the option. The sublease also provided 
for an adjustment of rent iflandlord raised prime tenant's rent during 
the period of the sublease. Subtenant wrote prime tenant to exercise 
the renewal option, and when the prime tenant did not seek arbitra-
tion, subtenant sent to prime tenant a document entitled "Renewal of 
Lease," which specified a new rent set unilaterally by subtenant. 
Prime tenant accepted rent checks at that amount for nearly a year 
before raising any objections to the rent. When, several years later, 
prime tenant brought an action to recover additional rent, the court 
affirmed the trial court's determination that the prime tenant was es-
topped from asserting any right to more rent than was paid by subten-
ant during the renewal period.135 
In a case like Altman, if landlord had immediately invoked the 
original lease's arbitration provision, or if landlord had asserted a 
right to collect fair market rent, tenant might have chosen to seek 
other premises. When landlord failed to object to tenant's proposal, 
and then accepted tenant's tender of rent, landlord made an implied 
representation on which tenant might well have relied. 
134. 677 P .2d 1215 (Alaska 1983). 
135. See id. at 1223. 
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C. Estoppel to Evict for Late Payment After Prior 
Acceptance of Late Rent Payments 
[Vol. 77:756 
When tenant frequently pays rent late, and landlord accepts those 
late payments, is landlord later estopped from bringing an action for 
possession based on tenant's late payment of rent? Some courts have 
suggested that if landlord's past acceptance of rent payments induces 
tenant to make subsequent late payments when tenant would other-
wise have paid on time, landlord is estopped from using those subse-
quent late payments as a foundation for eviction.136 Even these 
courts hold, however, that if tenant would have made the subsequent 
late payment in any event-for instance, because the tenant was 
abandoning its business-then tenant cannot assert landlord's prior 
acceptance as a basis for an estoppel defense.137 Furthermore, ifland-
lord, after accepting late payment of rent, provides tenant with notice 
that subsequent late payment will result in eviction, landlord dissi-
pates any estoppel effect created by prior acceptance.1aa That is, land-
lord's duty is largely a duty to warn. And, as is the case in other areas 
of property, not all courts embrace landlord's duty to warn a breaching 
tenant. Some courts hold that landlord's prior acquiescence in ten-
ant's late payments does not estop a landlord from evicting for delin-
quent payments.139 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Courts confront estoppel claims in almost every area of property 
law. In each area, the standard lore is the same. One party is es-
topped to act in a way that is inconsistent with a representation or 
promise that party has made if, when she made the representation or 
promise, it was reasonably foreseeable that another party would rely 
on it, and the other party did rely on it to his detriment.140 The stan-
136. See Lafayette Car Wash, Inc. v. Boes, 282 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind. 1972). 
137. See id. 
138. For example, in A.P. Development Corporation v. Band, 550 A.2d 1220 (N.J . 
1988), the court held that a landlord was not entitled to evict a tenant for habit-
ual late payment ofrent when the landlord's acceptance ofrent did not give clear 
notice that continued failure to pay rent promptly would lead to eviction. The 
court noted "[i)f the landlord's monthly late payment notices had clearly stated 
that the tenant's continued failure to pay rent promptly would lead to eviction, 
the landlord's position in this case would be upheld." Id. at 1231. Cf Riverside 
Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 650 P.2d 657 (Idaho 1982)(holding that once a landlord pro-
vides notice that late payment will lead to eviction, previous waiver does not pre-
vent landlord from enforcing lease; court discussed waiver, not estoppel). 
139. See S.H.V.C., Inc. v. Roy, 428 A.2d 806 (Conn. App. Ct. 1981). 
140. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.10 (Tentative Draft No. 
1, 1989)(endorsing similar formulation for creation of servitudes by estoppel). 
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dard doctrinal statement, however, obscures the different functions 
the estoppel doctrine plays in property law.141 
First, in many cases, the doctrinal requirements substantiate an 
express, seriously intended promise or transfer ofland. That is, courts 
invoke estoppel doctrine when the actions of the parties, taken in con-
text, duplicate the assurances we normally attribute to the statute of 
frauds: a serious promise was made, and there is strong evidence 
about the terms of the promise. When these assurances are absent-
when courts suspect that the promisor made only a casual statement, 
or that the parties reached only a preliminary agreement-invocation 
of the estoppel doctrine generally fails. When circumstances do pro-
vide strong evidence of a serious promise, however, courts typically 
enforce the promise as if it were a promise in writing. 
The case law also reveals a second use of the estoppel doctrine. 
Even when the parties have made no promise at all, a number of 
courts hold that within the context of particular ongoing relationships, 
one party may have a duty to rescue the other from foreseeable harm 
caused by the other party's mistaken understanding of the parties' re-
spective legal rights. Both the existence and the scope of this duty 
remain controversial in current doctrine, but within the relationship 
between neighbors, and between landlord and tenant, many courts are 
not willing to treat the parties as if they were strangers dealing with 
each other at arms' length, responsible only for obligations expressly 
undertaken. 
141. As Robert Hillman has noted in a recent study of promissory estoppel in contract 
law, "[c)ommentators sometimes seem too zealous to find the 'key' element of one 
law or another and seem unwilling to admit how complex the law may be." Hill-
man, supra note 4, at 619. 
